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We investigate the long-term effects of the important presence of Jews in Eastern Europe before the Second 
World War and their disappearance during the Holocaust. The Pale of Settlement, the area which Jewish 
residents were confined to in the Russian Empire, is used as a source of exogenous variation in the size of the 
Jewish population before the Second World War. Based on election and survey data, we find that current 
residents of the Pale, compared to their counterparts outside the Pale, vote more for socialist anti-market 
parties, have lower support for market economy and democracy, are less engaged in entrepreneurship, but 
exhibit higher levels of trust. At the same time, the Pale has no lasting effects on average consumption, 
income, and education levels. Regression discontinuity at the Pale border helps identification. We show that 
the effect of the Pale is related to the former presence of Jews rather than the inflow of new migrant 
population into the formerly-Jewish areas. We suggest a possible mechanism and present evidence consistent 
with it: non-Jewish population, at the time when two groups lived together side-by-side, developed persistent 
anti-market culture and bonding trust, rooted in ethnic hatred towards Jews. We show that, consistent with the 
mechanism, current residents of towns closer to places of pogroms exhibit higher trust and anti-market 
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During the twentieth century Eastern Europe experienced one of the most drastic changes of ethnic and 
religious composition of its population in the history of mankind.  Many dramatic events such as the 
Holocaust, multiple redrawing of the map of Europe after each of the two world wars, and Stalin’s 
deportations of entire ethnic groups contributed to this. Yet, by far the biggest change was caused by the mass 
murder of 5.6 to 6 million Jews during the Second World War. Before the war Jews accounted for over 30 
percent of the Eastern European urban population whereas they are hardly present in the territory nowadays.  
A large body of historical evidence suggests that Jews as a group in Eastern Europe were performing 
a particular social function in urban areas where they were allowed to live (e.g., Dubnow 1920; Slezkine 
2004; Botticini and Eckstein 2005). In contrast to the non-Jewish (Gentile) population, the vast majority of 
whom were engaged in farming and unskilled work, Jews had predominantly white collar occupations. In 
places where Jews were present, such activities as trading and the provision of services as market 
intermediaries and financiers were traditionally Jewish. The proportion of entrepreneurs and self-employed 
among Jews was also a lot higher than among representatives of the non-Jewish population (Slezkine, 2004, 
p. 47). Overall, historians agree that modernity is rooted in traditionally-Jewish social functions and attribute 
to Jews of 18
th-20
th century Eastern Europe a role as a driving force of capitalism and market development 
(e.g., Sombart 1913; Jacobs 1919; Veblen 1919; Slezkine 2004; Botticini and Eckstein 2005, Muller 2010).
1 
Given the important differences in culture, traditional occupations, and the particular social role of 
Jews compared to non-Jewish groups that lived in these territories side-by-side with Jews, and to migrants 
who replaced the Jews after the Second World War, one should expect to see important social, political, and 
economic effects of the Jewish presence in Eastern Europe for several centuries and their abrupt 
disappearance in the Second World War. Consistent with this hypothesis, a recent paper by Acemoglu, 
Hassan, and Robinson (2010) shows that areas within Russia, that had a higher percentage of Jews before the 
                                                 
1 “Most of the Jews in the Pale of Settlement …continued to pursue traditional service occupations as middlemen 
between the overwhelmingly agricultural Christian population and various urban markets. Most of the Jewish middlemen 
bought, shipped, and resold local produce; provided credit …leased and managed estates…kept taverns and 
inns…supplied manufactured goods… provided professional services… and served as artisans” (Slezkine 2004  p. 106, 









































war and were under German occupation during the war, and, therefore, were more affected by the Holocaust, 
have grown slower after the war and have a larger political support for the Communist Party of Russia after 
transition. Acemoglu et al. (2010) explain these results by the disappearance of the middle class–which was 
predominantly Jewish–from the social structure of the population in these areas. As acknowledged and 
discussed in Acemoglu et al. (2010), causal identification of the effects of the Holocaust is a difficult task due 
to serious endogeneity problems. The choice of location of residence by particular ethnic groups may depend 
on characteristics of localities which, in turn, may be correlated with development paths as well as with 
reasons for German occupation, which could be problematic for the difference-in-differences methodology 
used in Acemoglu et al. (2010). This paper also aims at estimating the long-run effects of the former presence 
and subsequent disappearance of Jews. We use the Pale of Settlement—the area of the Russian Empire 
outside of which Jews were not allowed to live— as an arguably exogenous source of variation of Jewish 
presence in Eastern Europe before the war.  
The Pale of Settlement was instituted at the end of the eighteenth century after the Russian Empire 
acquired a vast territory of Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, where Jews have been living since the 
fourteenth century. In order to keep Jews, alien to Orthodox Russia, away from the center, Catherine the Great 
made a list of western provinces (gubernii) of the Empire (subsequently called the Pale) allowing Jewish 
residence only in urban settlements and only within these territories. Historical sources point out that, despite 
the fact that the Pale allowed Jews in the Russian Empire in areas of historical Jewish residence, the Pale 
border within the Russian Empire was arbitrary, binding, and enforced (e.g., Klier 1986).   
In this paper, we analyze the long-run effect of the Pale of Settlement on the political, social, and 
economic development of present-day Eastern Europe. Since the Pale defined the pattern of Jewish residency 
for over a century, which largely persisted after the revolution of 1917, the binding border of the Pale helps 
identification of the long-run effect of the former presence of Jews on one side of the border. The Holocaust 
had removed Jews from the urban areas inside the Pale, while leaving the social and ethnic structure of the 
population outside the Pale practically intact, as Jewish presence outside the Pale in the Russian Empire was 









































residents, and some economic outcomes on the two sides of the Pale border. Importantly, after the war, the 
ethnic and religious composition of the population on the two sides of the border became indistinguishable, 
and therefore, the effects of the Pale that we observe today cannot be driven by the differences in the ethnic 
and religious mix of the population. In addition, we control for a wide range of possible co-determinants of 
political views and aspirations. Even though our analysis relies on cross-sectional geographic variation which 
inherently leaves room for an omitted variable bias, our focus primarily is on the estimation of a 
discontinuous jump at the Pale border, which helps causal identification.    
The first step in our analysis aims at establishing the effect of the Pale; as the second step, we study 
two potential channels of influence; and lastly, discuss the mechanism explaining our results. We find that 
current residents of the Pale area (if compared to their counterparts outside the Pale) vote less for political 
parties with pro-market liberal ideology and more for anti-market parties with socialist or communist 
ideology, express lower support for the market and democracy, are less satisfied with the state of the economy 
and its progress during transition, are less engaged in entrepreneurship, and exhibit higher levels of trust. At 
the same time, we find no effect of the Pale on such economic outcomes as consumption, income, and 
education. These basic results are robust across a wide range of specifications: we estimate a discontinuity at 
the Pale border, the average effect of the Pale, the effect of the share of Jews in the total population in the 
Russian Empire instrumented by the Pale. All approaches reveal the same pattern in the data.  
The next step in our analysis is to test between the two possible channels of influence. In particular, 
the Pale can have a long-run effect either because Jews used to live there before the Second World War or 
because there was an inflow of new migrant population into the areas where Jews used to live to fill in the 
empty space after the Second World War. We test for the effect of “new population” as a potential channel 
and reject it by showing that residents of the areas that experienced a substantial renewal of the non-Jewish 
population after the Second World War, which was unrelated to the Holocaust, do not exhibit similar 
attitudes, political preferences, or self-employment penetration as residents of the Pale. We conclude that the 









































Finally, we suggest a plausible mechanism that can explain the long-run effects of the Pale. We argue 
that the non-Jewish population developed a special anti-market culture and bonding trust among 
representatives of their own group at the time when Jews and Gentiles lived side-by-side in towns and shtetls 
inside the Pale. Historical sources document hostility, rivalry, and little social interaction beyond market 
transactions between Jews and Gentiles (Hoffman 1997, Slezkine 2004). The presence of a rival group in 
close proximity with alien religion, traditions and language and with a very specific social role as a market 
intermediary created a pressure on the non-Jewish population to unite against the Jews. This social pressure 
had two important consequences for the non-Jewish population within the Pale. First, ethnic antagonism 
between the two groups led to the development of within-group solidarity and trust. As this kind of trust 
developed in opposition to and against the rival group, it is often referred to as “bonding” as opposed to 
“bridging” social capital (Fukuyama 1995; Putnam 2000), or “limited” as opposed to “generalized” morality 
(Tabellini 2008).
2 Second, since Jews as a group represented a liberal pro-market force by their distinct 
traditional occupations, ethnic hostility of the non-Jewish population against Jews triggered the development 
of an anti-market culture among the non-Jewish population as anti-market sentiment was equated with anti-
Jewish sentiment. We argue that both the anti-market culture and within-group bonds have persisted among 
descendants of the Gentile population who lived in the Pale with the Jews up to the present day.
3 The bonding 
trust manifests itself in a higher percentage of people who trust others as the enemy group disappeared, while 
the anti-market culture manifests itself in political support for communist parties, opposition to market 
reforms, and lower entrepreneurship inside the Pale. We provide some suggestive evidence that the trust 
observed inside the Pale is bonding in nature as membership in civic non-political non-governmental 
organizations is smaller inside than outside the Pale, and there is no difference in trust in such institutions as 
banks and foreign investors.  
                                                 
2 The literature defines bridging social capital as connectedness formed across diverse social groups, whereas bonding 
capital is restricted to homogenous groups. 










































The suggested mechanism implies that anti-market culture and bonding trust are more pronounced in 
places that had higher ethnic animosity for a given ethnic and religious mix as ethnic animosity is the reason 
for formation of this particular culture. Under the assumption that the extent of historical ethnic animosity 
was positively related to the probability of pogroms conditional on the share of the Jewish population, this 
prediction is testable. To test this prediction, we collected historical data on the location of anti-Jewish 
pogroms conducted by local non-Jewish population in Eastern Europe. Consistent with our hypothesis, we 
find that proximity to places, where pogroms occurred, is significantly positively related to anti-market 
sentiment and trust among contemporary local population, irrespective of whether one controls for the 
historical and present-day ethnic and religious composition and Pale dummy. 
Acemoglu et al. (2010) suggested an additional (and complementary) mechanism: they argue that the 
Holocaust lead to a change in the composition of the population as the destruction of Jews was equivalent to 
the destruction of the middle class and a relatively more pro-market group in the population. Our results on 
voting patterns in the Pale and the attitudes towards the market are consistent with results presented in 
Acemoglu et al. (2010) despite differences in empirical strategy and geographical area under study.
4 This 
composition effect, however, is insufficient to explain the evidence in its entirety, as it has no prediction about 
trust. In addition, we do not find statistically significant differences in the share of middle class on two sides 
of the Pale border. 
This study contributes to a growing literature on the persistent impact of culture on institutions, 
political and economic outcomes (e.g., Greif 1994; Guiso et al. 2003; Guiso et al. 2006; Guiso et al. 2009; 
Tabellini 2008; Tabellini 2009; Becker et al. (2009); Fernandez 2008, 2010; Algan and Cahuc 2010; Alesina 
et al., 2010). It is also related to the literature which links social capital to social structures (e.g., Bourdieu 
1983; Putnam 1993). Our discussion of the bonding trust among Gentiles draws on the strand of this literature 
that distinguishes two types of social capital (Banfield 1958; Portes 1998; Putnam 2000; Bjornskov 2006; 
Tabellini 2008; Greif and Tabellini 2010).  
                                                 
4 Acemoglu et al. (2010) consider only Soviet Russia, excluding Ukraine, the Baltics, and Belarus.  We consider the 
territory of much of Eastern Europe: our smallest (baseline) sample includes Latvia, Ukraine and Russia; and our largest 









































We also contribute to a small but growing economic literature on the impact of the previous presence 
of Jews on long-term economic and political outcomes. For example, Pascali (2009) shows that Italian cities 
that had important Jewish communities in the 15
th century developed complex bank institutions. Waldinger 
(2009) uses the dismissal of (mainly Jewish) scientists by the Nazi government as a source of exogenous 
variation in the peer group of scientists and shows that it affects researchers’ productivity among co-authors. 
Akbulut-Yuksel and Yuksel (2010) find that dismissal and emigration of Jewish professionals and teachers 
from Germany in 1933 had a negative impact on education and social capital of Germans who were school 
aged during the Nazi regime.
5 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In the next section, we briefly summarize historical facts 
about the Pale of Settlement. Section 3 describes the data. Section 4 presents baseline results on the long-run 
effects of the Pale. In Section 5, we test between the two potential channels. Section 6 discusses and tests for 
the mechanisms. Section 7 describes results of various falsification tests. In Section 8, we conclude. 
2. Historical overview of the Pale of Settlement 
The Russian Empire acquired the largest Jewish community in the world after the three partitions of Poland 
(1772, 1793, and 1795) and the Congress of Vienna (1815) by annexing territories where Jews resided since 
the fourteenth century.
6 Prior to this vast territorial expansion westward, Jews were present in Russia in very 
small numbers and were expelled repeatedly by rulers: e.g., Ivan the Terrible, Catherine I, and Anna 
Ioanovna.  
After the 1
st partition, Russian Empire got territories of the contemporary Belarus with a large Jewish 
population. Jews got the legal social status of merchants and petty-bourgeois which meant that they did not 
have the right to travel without a special permission or live in the rural areas. This regulation did not have an 
                                                 
5 Less immediate, but no less important, connection is between our paper and the literatures on the consequences of 
conflicts, see, for instance, Blattmann (2009) and Bellows and Miguel (2006), and on determinants of perceptions in 
transition economies, see, for instance, Alesina and Fuchs-Schündeln (2007), Aghion et al. (2009), Denisova et al. 
(2009), Grosjean and Senik (2010).  











































anti-Jewish discriminatory character at first as the same restrictions applied to merchants and petty-bourgeois 
of all other nationalities. As many Jews started to apply for permission to travel to and settle in cities in the 
central Russia, local (Orthodox Christian) merchants started to complain to Catherine II (the Great) about 
increased competition coming from alien (Jewish) merchants. This triggered Catherine to issue a special 
decree concerning restrictions on Jewish residency. In December 1791, she issued the first decree allowing 
specifically Jewish presence in the four—at that time most western—provinces (gubernias) of the Empire: the 
whole of Belarus (Polotskaya and Mogilevskaya provinces) and Ekaterinoslavskaya and Tavricheskaya 
provinces (called “namestnichestvos”). Historically, Jews lived in Belarus (appropriated through the 1
st 
partition of Poland in 1772), but not in Ekaterinoslavskaya and Tavricheskaya provinces, which became a part 
of the Empire in 1774 after the Russian-Turkish war of 1768-1774. The latter two territories (called 
“Novorossiya,” i.e., New Russia, which are a part of contemporary Ukraine) were severely under-populated 
and Catherine decided to use Jewish settlers to develop these territories. As a result, the decree of 1791 
formed what later became the central and southern parts of the eastern border of the Pale.  The area where 
Jews were allowed to live was extended further to the west after the 2
nd partition of Poland. The decree of 
1794 added the following areas to those with legal Jewish presence: Minskaya, Iziaslavskaya (Volynskaya), 
Bratzlavskaya (Podolskaya), Kievskaya, Chernigovskaya, Novgorod-Severskaya provinces. This change did 
not affect the eastern (inner) border of the Pale, as the territory was just expanded westward. The 3
rd partition 
of 1795 brought Russia another extensive territory with a substantial Jewish presence. Catherine’s degree of 
1795 extended the territory of the Pale further following this partition, but only a part of newly acquired 
territories were added to the list of Jewish provinces (namely, Vilenskaya and Grodnenskaya). This decree 
effectively outlawed Jews in the northern part of the Empire’s new territories, which are parts of 
contemporary Latvia and were among historical areas of Jewish residence. The decree instituted the northern 
part of the border of the Pale within Russian Empire. Later on, the Congress of Vienna of 1815 created a new 
political entity headed by the Russian royal power from a part of the Duchy of Warsaw, namely, the Kingdom 
of Poland; and in 1818, Empire acquired Bessarabia. The legal area of Jewish residence in the Russian Empire 









































coincides with the frontier of the Empire. In 1835, the Pale of Settlement was instituted by law (which 
replaced decrees issues previously); according to this law Jews were allowed residency in urban areas only 
inside the Pale (within the borders established previously by decrees) and were not allowed residency in rural 
areas throughout the Empire.
7 Jews were also forbidden to own land. These restrictions were present until the 
1917 revolution.  
The Pale occupied territories of much of Eastern Europe, namely, parts of contemporary Latvia, 
Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, and the whole of contemporary Belarus and Moldova. Figure B1 in 
the Appendix portrays the borders of the Pale of Settlement on the current map of Eastern Europe. Within the 
territories of the Russian Empire, the Pale border cut through contemporary Russia, Ukraine, and Latvia.  
According to the 1897 Russian empire Census, 4.5 million Jews lived in the Pale, which constituted 
94% of all Jewish residents of the Russian Empire. They constituted over 11% of the total Pale population 
and 37% of its urban population. Table A1 in the Data Appendix presents the numbers of Jewish residents of 
the Pale by province. 
Despite the fact that the Pale allowed Jews in the Russian Empire roughly in areas of historical Jewish 
residence, the Pale border within the Russian Empire was fairly arbitrary, particularly, in the northern and 
southern parts of it. Before Catherine II established the Pale border, Jews were present on both sides of its 
northern part (territories of contemporary Latvia) and were not present on both sides of its southern part 
(territories of contemporary Ukraine). Historical sources (e.g., Pipes 1975 and Klier 1986) point out that 
Catherine the Great did not know much about the newly acquired territories and sent intelligence to learn 
about them. But even before getting the information, she decided to satisfy demands of Christian merchants’ 
demands to keep Jews as far away from central Russia as possible. The arbitrariness of the border of the Pale 
was ensured by the absence of information about local conditions on newly acquired territories through which 
the Pale border cut. At the same time, historical evidence also suggests that the border was well enforced to a 
                                                 
7 There were several exceptions to the Pale law. The most notable are as follows. “Native Jews” were allowed to stay in 
Courland province despite it being outside the Pale. In 1820s, Jews were evicted from several cities inside the Pale, such 









































large extent with the help of local population outside the Pale and, particularly, local merchants.
8 Dubnow 
(1920) and Pipes (1975) give many anecdotes illustrating the binding character of the restrictions on Jewish 
residence. Extraditions from Russian territories outside the Pale were implemented using military convoys. 
Jews were extradited to the cities inside the Pale, where they were left on the street without accommodation or 
work (Pipes, 1975).  
Table 1 presents information about the percentage of Jewish residents according to the 1897 Census 
in the provinces of the Russian Empire adjacent to the Pale border inside and outside the Pale. Jews 
constituted 37% of the urban population and 7.5% of the total population in an average province close to the 
Pale border inside the Pale. In contrast, they were only 4% and 0.7% of the urban and total population of an 
average province close to the Pale border outside the Pale. The Table shows that the minimum percentages of 
Jews in the urban and total population among all provinces adjacent to the Pale border inside the Pale are 
substantially larger than the maximum figures for the provinces adjacent to the Pale border outside the Pale.  
The beginning of the twentieth century was marked by mass emigration of Jews who faced severe 
discrimination inside the Pale in terms of double taxation and limited access to education and other public 
goods. Altshuler (1998) estimates that between 1897 and 1915, 1.3 million Jews left Russia to the Americas, 
Western Europe, and Palestine.
9 Very few Jews, however, moved outside the Pale in Russia due to the very 
restrictive legal conditions imposed on Jews wanting to do so. For example, first-guild merchants were 
allowed to leave the Pale; but according to Dubnow (1920) there were only 108 Jewish first-guild merchants. 
Another legal condition for leaving the Pale was conversion into Christianity, which was acceptable to very 
few (Dubnow 1920, p.219). 
After the Russian Revolution of February 1917, the Provisional Government abolished the Pale of 
Settlement together with the rest of the anti-Jewish restrictions present in the Russian Empire. The abolition 
                                                 
8 There were several groups in the population of Russian Empire that had restricted mobility; but the restrictions for Jews 
were active the longest.  In the fall of 1907 the third Imperial Duma passed the bill which allowed free movement for all 
groups in the population except Jews: “No one shall be limited in the right of choosing his place of residence and in 
moving from place to place, except… the Jews who arrive in localities situated outside the Pale of Settlement” (Dubnow 
1920, p. 154). 
9 Despite the emigration, the Jewish population of the Pale remained large due to high birth rate and dropping mortality 









































of Pale restrictions triggered Jewish migration inside Russia. Most of this migration, however, was towards 
the regional centers and major cities offering economic opportunities (such as Moscow, Odessa or Saint 
Petersburg) and there was very little migration just across the Pale border (Stampfer 1995, Pinkus 1998).
10 
This is important for our analysis as the discontinuity of the percentage of Jews in the urban population at the 
Pale border persisted up until the Second World War. According to the Soviet Census of 1939, only Moscow 
and Leningrad (St. Petersburg) regions displayed substantial presence of Jews among their urban population 
outside the former Pale of Settlement (4.5 and 5.1%, respectively). Jews constituted on average 1.6% of the 
urban population in the Russian regions close to the Pale border outside the Pale in 1939 and 8.2% of the 
urban population in Russian and Ukrainian regions close to the Pale border inside the Pale.
11  
The discontinuity of religious and ethnic composition at the Pale border ended with the Holocaust as 
Jews were mass-murdered and the few survivors settled after the war in large metropolitan areas rather than 
small towns close to the Pale border. The first after-war Census of 1959 reports a Jewish population of less 
than 1% in Russia’s regions in and out of the Pale.
12  
After the Holocaust, most places where Jews used to be present in large numbers saw significant in-
migration of non-Jews who came primarily from villages to neighboring towns and (former) shtetls. At the 
same time, most areas had significant inter-generational continuity as descendants of non-Jews who lived 
side-by-side with Jews before the Holocaust continued to live in the same towns.       
3. Data sources and description of the main variables 
We rely on two types of data sources on contemporary outcomes: official electoral statistics and survey data.  
3.1. Election data  
First, we consider election results at the electoral district level. For the baseline analysis, which compares 
outcomes at the two sides of the Pale border within the Russian Empire, we collected results of parliamentary 
                                                 
10 See also http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/History_of_the_Jews_in_Ukraine and http://www.eleven.co.il. 
11 The data from 1939 Census are less precise than the data from the 1897, as Soviet statistics report Census results at the 
regional level, which is substantially more aggregated than uezd-level information available for the Russian Empire 
Census and borders of the regions of Soviet republics do not coincide with borders of provinces in the Russian Empire. 









































elections in the three countries with within-country variation in the Pale: Latvia, Russia, and Ukraine. The 
data are available for the following elections: 1998, 2002, and 2006 in Latvia; 1995, 1999, and 2003 in 
Russia; and 1998, 2002, and 2006 in Ukraine. The data come from the official electoral commissions in each 
respective country (see Table A2 in the online Data Appendix for details). We examined the political 
manifestos of all parties participating in all of these elections and coded each political party according to 
whether it advocated: 1) anti-market, socialist/communist ideology, 2) liberal, pro-market ideology in support 
of liberal market reforms, or 3) neither of the above. The list of the political parties with anti-market 
socialist/communist and pro-market liberal ideologies is presented in the Table A3 in the online Data 
Appendix. We take the aggregated percentages of the total vote for each of the two groups of parties as 
political outcomes in our analysis. 
Our main focus is on regions (subnational administrative units) in each of the three countries that 
have within-region variation in whether electoral districts in this region belong to the Pale. The reason for this 
is that variation in election results among subnational units is substantial and depends on many unobserved 
factors, such as, for instance, political orientation of the regional governor. In contrast, election results across 
different electoral districts within the same region are usually fairly similar. For each electoral district in each 
country in each election, we code whether the district is entirely inside the Pale, entirely outside the Pale, or 
the Pale border cuts through the district.
13 In addition, we collect information on which electoral districts are 
urban areas (i.e., located in towns) and which are located in the regional center (i.e., main regional city).  
In Latvia there are three regions with within-region variation: Latgale, Vidzeme,  and Zemgale, with 
altogether 32 electoral districts outside the Pale, 8 electoral districts on the border, and 13 districts inside the 
Pale. In Russia, there are four regions with within-region variation: Bryanskaya, Pskovskaya, Smolenskaya, 
and Tverskaya regions (oblasts) with 91 electoral districts outside the Pale, 27 on the border, and 9 inside the 
Pale. In Ukraine, there are five regions with within-region variation: Donetskaya, Kharjkovskaya, 
Luganskaya, Sumskaya, and Ternopoljskaya regions (oblasts) with 14 electoral districts outside the Pale, 21 
                                                 









































on the border, and 14 inside the Pale.
14 Summary statistics for the vote for the “pro-market” and for the “anti-
market” parties by type of district are provided in Table A4 in the online Data Appendix. 
For the analysis of the channels of influence, we use data for elections in Poland in 2001, 2005, and 
2007 and in Lithuania in 1996, 2000, and 2006. Details of these data and methodology are provided below; 
summary statistics are presented in Table A4. 
3.2. Survey data on attitudes and economic outcomes  
The second source of data on outcomes is the “Life in Transition Survey” (LiTS) of residents of transition 
countries of Eastern Europe and Central Asia conducted by the World Bank and the European Bank for 
Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) in 2006. The survey data are available at 
http://www.ebrd.com/russian/pages/research/analysis/publications/transition/data.shtml. The main results of 
the survey and its methodology are summarized in EBRD (2007). Individuals from a representative sample of 
1000 individuals from 50 settlements (Primary Sampling Units, PSUs) in each transition country were asked a 
wide array of questions on their attitudes towards market reform, democracy, and transition as well as on 
socio-demographic characteristics and consumption of respondents’ households.
15  
In the baseline analysis, we use data for Latvia, Ukraine, and Russia, as these three countries have 
within-country variation in PSUs outside and inside the Pale.
16 In addition, some of our specifications include 
data from other Eastern European countries (i.e., Belarus, Estonia, Lithuania, Poland, and Moldova). We 
focus on questions about attitudes towards market reform, democracy, satisfaction with the state of the 
economy (overall and compared to the pre-transition period), entrepreneurship measured by penetration of 
self-employment, and trust. In particular, we construct the following variables at the individual-level using 
survey responses: 1) dummy indicating the respondent’s preference for a market over a planned economy; 2) 
                                                 
14 These numbers are given according to electoral district division for the first election in each country; they change only 
slightly for the subsequent elections. 
15 For details about sampling methodology in LiTS see  
http://www.ebrd.org/downloads/research/economics/LiTSrepo.pdf. 
16 In all specifications, we exclude Russia’s PSUs in the Eastern Siberia and Far East because of their irrelevance due to 
the large distance from the Pale border. Many of our specifications, however, confine the sample to PSUs in the 
immediate neighborhood of the Pale border. The inclusion of the Siberian and Far Eastern PSUs into the sample does not 









































dummy indicating the respondent’s preference for democracy over autocratic regime; 3) the respondent’s 
assessment of the economic situation in her country today in comparison to 1989 on the scale from 1 to 5; 4) 
the respondent’s general assessment of the economic situation in her country on the scale from 1 to 5; 5) 
dummy for whether the respondent is self-employed; and  6) dummy for trust in others. We use information 
on the respondent’s consumption, relative income, and education both as controls in regressions for attitudes 
and self-employment and also as separate economic outcomes. In addition, the list of individual-level control 
variables in regressions for LiTS outcomes includes socio-demographic characteristics of respondents from 
the survey such as age, gender, labor market status, religion, and ethnic majority/minority status. The exact 
formulations of survey questions, definitions of all variables used in the analysis, and summary statistics 
separately for PSUs inside and outside the Pale are provided in the online Data Appendix (see tables A5-A7).  
3.3. Geographic data 
We used a multitude of historical sources to create a digital map of the Pale of Settlement. In addition, we 
created digital maps of the Second Polish Republic, and the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
17 For each 
PSU from the LiTS survey in our sample of countries we also collected their exact geographical coordinates.
18 
Using these data, we calculate the closest distance from each PSU to the eastern border of the Pale (i.e., the 
land border of the Pale inside the Russian Empire). Geographical coordinates of the PSUs also allowed us to 
collect additional geographical control variables, such as elevation, and average temperature, precipitation, 
and evaporation for the months of January and July for each PSU. Elevation comes from the GPS Visualizer 
website and all other variables come from the Global GIS dataset.  
                                                 
17 The following historical maps were used to create digital maps used in our analysis: the Russian Empire digital map 
from “Russia GIS project” provided by Andre Zerger (CSIRO Sustainable Ecosystems), the Pale of Settlement map from 
Perlmann (2006); and non-digital maps of the regions (gubernii) of the Russian Empire 




http://www.pseudology.org/evrei/ChertaOsed.htm.   









































3.4. Historical data on demographics and pogroms 
Finally, we used historical data from censuses in the Russian, German and Austro-Hungarian Empires, the 
Soviet Union, and contemporary censuses in the Eastern European countries from our sample to collect 
information about ethnic and religious composition at the end of the nineteenth and at the end of the twentieth 
century for all PSUs of the LiTS survey at the level of a local administrative unit (analogue of county).
19 We 
also collected historical data on coordinates of anti-Jewish pogroms in the 19
th and 20
th century Eastern 
Europe, we describe the sources of these data below. 
4. The effect of the Pale 
In this section, we establish basic facts about the differences in outcomes on the two sides of the Pale border 
within the Russian Empire. Our focus is on the three countries of Eastern Europe which have one part of their 
territory outside and another part inside the Pale, i.e., Latvia, Russia, and Ukraine. 
4.1. Election results 
We start by comparing election results inside and outside the Pale for anti-market communist/socialist and 
pro-market liberal reform parties in these three countries. As we mentioned above, we confine our sample to 
regions (subnational administrative units) in each of the respective countries through which the Pale border 
cuts within the Russian Empire. We pool data for all elections and estimate simple OLS regressions for each 
country with the percentage of total vote received by anti-market communist/socialist and by pro-market 
liberal political parties in electoral district as dependent variables and dummies for “inside the Pale” and 
“being on the Pale border” as the main explanatory variables (thus, “outside the Pale” is the comparison 
group). We control for whether electoral district is urban and also for the regional centers, as usually residents 
of urban areas and regional capitals have different political preferences compared to those of rural areas. We 
                                                 
19 Much of this information is available online. In particular, we relied on the following sources: http://demoscope.ru/; 
http://www.shtetlinks.jewishgen.org/; http://www.jewishgen.org/; http://www.jewishencyclopedia.com/; 
http://verwaltungsgeschichte.de/; http://etno.us.org.ua/; http://www.statoids.com/; http://www.lu.lv/; 
http://www.csb.gov.lv/; http://www.stat.gov.lt/en/; http://www.stat.ee/; http://eja.pri.ee/; 










































also control for regional and election dummies and cluster the error term by electoral district. Regional 
dummies control for all regional level variation, including differences in economic development, political 
institutions, and political affiliation of leadership. Election dummies control for differences in political 
landscape and macroeconomic trends. We run three specifications for each country and each dependent 
variable: without any additional controls (i.e., only with region and election dummies), with controls for 
dummies indicating regional center and city districts; and with a control for city districts excluding regional 
centers from the sample. Note that our primary specification is the one excluding regional centers because 
regional centers usually are a lot larger than the rest of the electoral districts and since there is only one 
regional center in each region, there is no match for it across the Pale border.  
Table 2 presents the results. The upper panel presents regressions with the vote for anti-market 
communist and socialist parties as the dependent variable and the lower panel shows regressions for the pro-
market reform vote. The Pale is associated with a significantly higher vote for communist and socialist parties 
in Latvia and Russia (and in the sample of all countries pooled together, not reported for conciseness). In an 
average subnational region, one part of which is in the Pale and another part is outside, political parties with 
communist and socialist ideology got on average 5 percentage points more of the total vote in Russia and 12 
percentage points more in Latvia in the electoral districts inside the Pale compared to districts outside the 
Pale. In our baseline sample of regions through which the Pale border cuts, the mean vote for 
communists/socialists is 25 percent with a standard deviation of 15 percentage points. There is no significant 
effect of the Pale on the combined vote for the two parties of communist/socialist ideology in Ukraine: the 
Communist Party of Ukraine and the Socialist Party of Ukraine. The former is known as a party of retired 
people as its political agenda is limited to the social support for retirees. Naturally, as the electorate of the 
Communist Party of Ukraine, namely retirees, has equal representation in electoral districts on both sides of 
the Pale border, the vote for the Communist Party of Ukraine is unrelated to the geographical position of 
electoral district vis-à-vis the Pale border. In contrast, the Socialist Party of Ukraine is a party with broader 
political agenda and a more diverse electorate which includes some young people. When we run regressions 









































retired); while the results of the vote for the Socialist Party of Ukraine are consistent with the results for 
Latvia and Russia: they are significantly higher in electoral districts in the Pale compared to electoral districts 
outside the pale. Table B1 in the online Auxiliary Results Appendix presents these findings. 
The lower panel of Table 2 explores the relationship between the Pale and the percentage of votes for 
pro-market parties in the three countries. As above, there is a significant negative effect of the Pale on the 
vote for pro-market parties in Latvia and Russia and no significant effect in Ukraine. The Pale decreases the 
vote for pro-market parties by 6.7 and 0.6 percentage points in Latvia and Russia, respectively, which is equal 
to 65% and 12% of SDs. The mean vote for pro-market parties is 31% in Latvia and 5% in Russia in the 
regions on the Pale border.
20 The election results are robust to including the whole countries rather than just 
the Pale-border regions into the sample. In addition, the results are robust to running regressions separately 
for each election. The results of these robustness checks are available from the authors upon request. 
4.2. Attitudes 
Using the Life in Transition Survey, we estimate the discontinuity in attitudes of the population and in 
economic outcomes comparing settlements at both sides of the border of the Pale within the Russian Empire 
which was binding with respect to allowing Jewish presence. Let us denote an outcome of interest for 
individual i by i y ; a dummy indicator of whether the settlement where individual i lives is located inside the 
Pale by  i p . For each PSU in Latvia, Russia, and Ukraine, we calculate the minimum distance to the border. 
We denote the distance by d, and set it to be positive for all PSUs inside the Pale and negative for PSUs 
outside the pale ( 0 > i d  iff  1 = i p ; and  0 < i d  iff  0 = i p ). Thus, we are interested in whether  i y  jumps 
discontinuously at  0 = d . We adopt two alternative approaches: the discontinuity sample approach (Angrist 
and Lavy, 1999) and a parametric control function approach (Heckman and Robb, 1985).  
First, we estimate a simple OLS regression on the whole sample: 
                                                 
20 The fact that we do not find significant results for Ukrainian pro-market parties deserves a note. The pro-market liberal 
reform parties in Ukraine are Narodnyi Rukh, Our Ukraine, and Timoshenko blok. These parties are substantially less 
ideological then their counterparts in Latvia and Russia, as they built their agendas on political support for concrete 









































i i i i p y ε β α + + + = γ x ' ,          ( 1 )  
where, as above, i y is an outcome variable;  i p is “in Pale” dummy; xi denotes the vector of control variables 
(to be described below); and  i ε  denotes the error term clustered by PSUs. Parameter β  estimates the average 
difference in outcomes between individuals inside and outside the Pale. The reduced sample approach 
consists in estimating equation (1) limiting the sample to PSUs in the neighborhood of the Pale border. Thus, 
we include in the sample only individuals i for whom  Δ < | | i d . We consider three alternative samples, 
gradually reducing the maximum allowed distance to the Pale border to 140, 70, and 35 kilometers.  
Alternatively, we estimate the discontinuity at the border using the RD control function method by 
including in the list of covariates the two fourth-order polynomials of the distance to the Pale border on both 
sides of the Pale: 













) ( φ δ .     (2) 
We consider equation (2) as our primary specification; but as we would like to make sure that the results are 
robust across specifications, we present the estimation results of both equations.  
We do not expect to see any discontinuity at the Pale border for rural PSUs because Jews were not 
allowed to live in rural areas on either side of the Pale border. Thus, we estimate equations (1) and (2) 
separately for urban and metropolitan PSUs and for rural PSUs.  
The set of controls xi includes country dummies, settlement characteristics, and individual 
characteristics. The following settlement characteristics are in the list of covariates: dummy for metropolitan 
areas (in the non-rural sample), longitude, elevation, religious fractionalization (calculated using information 
on religion of survey respondents), and dummy for Western Ukraine whenever any of the Western Ukrainian 
PSUs are in the sample.
21 In baseline regressions that restrict the sample to the very few PSUs located no 
                                                 
21 The electoral map of Ukraine is divided into two roughly equal-size parts: residents of Western Ukraine 
overwhelmingly supported the “orange” revolution and pro-western policies; in contrast, the majority of the population 
in Eastern Ukraine supports pro-Russian policies and Victor Yanukovitch. The main distinction between the east and the 
west of Ukraine is the percentage of ethnic Russians in the population. We set Western Ukraine dummy equal to one if 









































more than 35 kilometers from the border (11 in the urban sample and 8 in the rural sample), we exclude 
longitude as, otherwise, there is not enough variation to rely on. In all other baseline regressions, longitude is 
in the list of covariates. Section 7 addresses the issue of a possible confounding effect of longitude in a 
placebo experiment.  
In addition, we experimented with adding latitude, temperature, precipitation and evaporation for 
January and/or July, and the size of the settlements as additional control variables, and found that their 
inclusion does not change the results and these variables themselves do not add explanatory power. We 
consider a possible confounding effect of the Polish Lithuanian Commonwealth in the robustness section 
below. 
In regressions with individual attitudes and the self-employment dummy as dependent variables, the 
list of individual-level controls consists of gender, age (with a quadratic term), education level dummies, 
consumption, employment status dummies, ethnic minority dummy, and religion dummies. Our results are 
robust to controlling for relative income as well, but we exclude it from the baseline specification as it has 
little explanatory power beyond consumption which is always included in the set of covariates. In regressions 
with economic outcomes (such as consumption, relative income, and education) as dependent variables, the 
respective variable is excluded from the set of covariates. 
Table 3 presents results for various attitudes and self-employment as dependent variables in the 
sample of urban and metropolitan settlements. For each dependent variable, we present 5 sets of regressions: 
OLS on the whole sample, OLS on the sample limited to PSUs with distance to the border of no more that 
140, 70, and 35 kilometers, and the RD regression with control function (as described above).  
The first (upper) panel presents regressions for the individual preference towards the market and 
democracy in urban and metropolitan areas. Crossing the border of the Pale from the outside leads to a 20 
percentage point drop in the support for the market and a 26 percentage point drop in the support for 
                                                                                                                                                                   
Kiev, despite the fact that it has 13% of ethnic Russians amongst its residents. We do this because it is the capital and the 
vast majority of the population in Kiev is “pro-orange.” It is important to note that exclusion of Western Ukraine dummy 









































democracy. The discontinuity at the border equals to about 0.4 and 0.5 of the standard deviations of these 
variables in the considered sample, respectively.  
The second panel presents regressions for the individual assessment of economic progress during 
transition and of the overall state of the economy. We find that residents on the Pale side of the border agree 
significantly less with the statement that the economic situation in their respective countries is better today 
than before transition started in 1989 and they assess the state of the economy significantly less positively. 
The magnitudes of the discontinuous drop at the border equal to one half and one third of standard deviations 
of these variables respectively.  
The third (lower) panel of Table 3 presents results on self-employment and on trust. The probability 
that a resident in urban areas is self-employed is significantly smaller in urban and metropolitan settlements 
inside the Pale compared to similar settlements outside the Pale. The magnitude is as follows: crossing the 
Pale border into the Pale leads to an 11 percentage point decrease in the share of self-employed, i.e., the size 
of the drop equals to one half of the standard deviation of this variable. 
Finally, trust is significantly higher in urban and metropolitan settlements inside the Pale compared to 
similar settlements outside the Pale: crossing the Pale border into the Pale leads to a 29 percentage point 
increase in the share of the population who trust others, which equals to about 0.6 of its standard deviation.  
All of the results presented in Table 3 are robust both in terms of magnitude and statistical 
significance to the changes in the estimation method as can be seen from the comparison of different 
columns.
22 In addition, the results are robust to excluding metropolitan areas from the sample and controlling 
for the size of the settlement (results are available from the authors upon request). 
Table 4 presents results of regressions analogous to those presented in Table 3, but for the sample of 
rural areas. In contrast to the results for urban areas, in rural PSUs, we do not find robust relationship between 
the Pale border and the outcomes. The coefficients on the “in Pale” dummy in the rural sample are 
insignificant for most of the outcomes, and importantly, in most cases when they are significant, they have the 
                                                 
22 If longitude is included as a covariate in the most restrictive specification (with distance lower than 35 km from the 
border), the results for the preference for the market and democracy and for the satisfaction with the state of the economy 









































opposite sign to the robust effect present in urban areas. As Jews did not live in rural areas on either side of 
the Pale border, one can consider the effect of the Pale in rural areas as a placebo treatment. If our results 
were driven by some omitted spatial variation rather than the fact that the Pale regulated Jewish residence in 
the Russian Empire, we would have obtained similar results for rural and urban areas. The positive effect of 
the Pale in the rural sample in a few specifications for the preference for the market and democracy suggests 
that we might underestimate the effect of the Pale on these outcomes for the urban areas as the overall pattern 
in the data is such that there is (possibly) a higher preference for market and democracy towards the west and 
the Pale is in the west. Below in the robustness section 7, we present results of additional falsifications tests 
based on placebo experiments, in which we estimate the discontinuity at the shifted border of the Pale and at 
various meridians.
23 
In order to check the validity of our regression discontinuity approach, we verify that the controls do 
not exhibit a discontinuity at the Pale border. In particular, we run the RD control function and reduced 
sample regressions for each variable used as a control in equations (1) and (2). Thus, we estimate the 
following equations:  i i i p x ε β α + + = ,  s.t.  Δ < | | i d  and  i i i i d f p x ε β α + + + = ) (  for each component  i x  
in the vector of covariates  i x  and for all other possible variables that we considered as potential co-
determinants of our outcomes in robustness checks but did not include in the baseline specification. In all of 
these regressions with one exception, the coefficients on pi are statistically insignificant and very close to 
zero.
24 The only covariate that exhibits a discontinuous jump at the Pale border is elevation: urban PSUs close 
to the Pale border inside the Pale are 79 meters higher than similar PSUs on the opposite side of the Pale 
border. Our main identification assumption (backed up by historical evidence) is that the border of the Pale is 
arbitrary and did not reflect some important geographical or economic heterogeneity. The available 
geographical characteristics with the exception of elevation, i.e., temperature, precipitation, evaporation, and 
                                                 
23 Note that, if we pool the urban and rural samples together, statistically significant and robust effect of the Pale is found 
for the vast majority of the outcomes, but the magnitude of coefficients is consistently smaller than in the urban sample. 
There are two regressions in which statistical significance is lost in the pooled sample: in RD regressions for preference 
for market and democracy.  









































cloudiness, are not related to the Pale border. As far as the elevation is concerned, we verify that it has no 
significant relationship with our outcomes irrespective of whether we include the Pale dummy in the list of 
covariates, and therefore, we conclude that it cannot drive our results. As it exhibits a jump at the border, we 
include it as control in all specifications. The reason to include other controls  i x  in our baseline regressions is 
solely to increase the precision of the estimates of β  and the results should be robust to excluding controls. 
Table B2 in the Auxiliary Results Appendix reports results of regressions similar to the ones reported in Table 
3, but without any controls. Indeed, we find that the results are very similar.  
We illustrate our baseline results (presented in Table 3) graphically in the online Auxiliary Results 
Appendix B. Figure B2 presents unconditional averages of each of our outcomes at the two sides of the Pale 
border by distance; in Figure B3, for each outcome we plot the estimated control function, i.e., the 
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confidence intervals. In addition, we plot averages for every five respondents on the same graph. Using the 
same methodology, Figure B4 illustrates the discontinuity in the share of the Jewish population in 1897 on the 
two sides of the Pale border in the settlements and in counties (uezds) of the Russian Empire for the LiTS 
PSUs using 1897 Russian Empire census data.  
4.3. Economic outcomes 
In the regressions for attitudes we used consumption and education as controls.
 We already mentioned above 
that the Pale does not significantly affect any of these controls.
25 In addition, we considered respondents’ 
relative income at individual level and population growth for 100 years since 1897 at the settlement level and 
found that there is no significant relationship between these variables and the Pale. Thus, we found the 
discontinuity at the Pale border only in one economic outcome, namely, self-employment.  
                                                 
25 A non-result on education is consistent with Acemoglu et al. (2010) and is of particular interest. It supports the 
premise of historians that there was no transmission of human or social capital from Jews to Gentiles inside the Pale as 
Jews were more educated compared to Gentiles and now we do not see the difference in education of the Gentile 
population on the two sides of the pale border. According to the 1897 census, less than 28% of the total Russian 









































4.4. Scaling the results by former Jewish presence (IV estimation) 
So far we presented the results of the estimation of the reduced form relationship: between the Pale and 
outcomes. Our hypothesis, however, has two underlying stages. The Pale regulated Jewish residence in the 
Russian Empire and the former Jewish presence has a long-term effect on attitudes and self-employment. 
Thus, we can run a 2SLS regression to relate outcomes to the percentage of Jewish residents in the Russian 
Empire, where the latter is predicted by the Pale. This exercise amounts to a re-scaling of the results, which 
helps to understand the magnitudes better. Panel A of Table 5 presents the results of the first-stage 
relationship relating the percentage of Jews in 1897 in urban PSUs and the percentage of Jews in 1897 in 
counties (uezds) for both samples of non-rural and rural PSUs to the Pale dummy in our baseline sample of 
three countries with within country variation in the Pale dummy. (The settlement-level data on percentage of 
Jews in 1897 exist only for a subset of urban and metropolitan PSUs.) We present the results at PSU level 
without controls and at the individual-level with all control variables (which is the actual first-stage). As 
expected, the Pale dummy is a strong predictor of the percentage of Jews in the population both at county 
(uezd) and settlement level. The share of Jews in urban settlements was 27.6 percentage points higher inside 
the Pale compared to outside the Pale, and it was 8 percentage points higher in counties. F-statistics for the 
Pale dummy are always above 10, and, therefore, we do not need to worry about a weak-instrument problem.  
The rest of Table 5 presents results of the second-stage regressions: Panel B -- for the sample of urban 
and metropolitan PSUs; and Panel C -- for rural PSUs. The results are consistent with the reduced form. The 
higher share of the Jewish population in the Russian Empire is associated with significantly lower support for 
the market and democracy, lower assessment of the transition process and the current state of the economy, 
lower penetration of self-employment, and higher trust for urban PSUs today. The magnitude of the results for 
urban PSUs is as follows: an increase in the percentage of Jews in 1897 by 10 percentage points in a 
settlement (which approximately equals to one half of the standard deviation increase) leads to a 7 percentage 
point decline in the support for the market and democracy, approximately a 10 percent of the SD decline in 









































employment, and a 6 percentage point increase in trust.
26 For rural PSUs, we find no statistically significant 
relationship for all outcomes but one, namely, coefficient on the percent of Jews in 1897 for the preference for 
democracy is significant.
27  
5. Channels: former presence of Jews vs. new migrants 
The previous section established that the Pale of Settlement is consequential in the long-term for political 
preferences of the electorate, attitudes towards the market and democracy, assessment of  the economic 
transition process and the current state of economy, entrepreneurship and trust. In this section, we focus on 
the possible channels of influence.  
The Pale of Settlement could have an effect on today’s outcomes either because Jews lived in the Pale 
before or because new migrant population settled in the Pale when Jews were eliminated by the Nazis. Both 
of these channels can potentially have a long-term effect. New migrants, without roots in the place of 
residence, may have attitudes and aspirations quite different from those held by representatives of groups with 
traditions and culture formed in one place during centuries.
28 Since Jews as a group played a special social 
and economic role in society, the Holocaust, which resulted in a drastic social change, may also have a long 
term effect. We discuss possible mechanisms through which the former Jewish presence affects current 
outcomes in detail in the next section.  
                                                 
26 Simple OLS regressions which relate shares of Jews in the Russian Empire to our outcomes today yield significant 
results only once we confine the sample close enough to the Pale border (not reported). One possible explanation for this 
is that within the Pale, Jews were able to move freely and the choice of their location was not exogenous. Particularly, 
they may have chosen places of residence where the non-Jewish population was more positively inclined to liberal 
values (and these values persisted to the present day). 
27 It is worth noting that all results described in this section use OLS for simplicity of interpretation of the magnitude of 
the effects. Results are robust to using probit when outcomes are dummy variables and ordered probit when outcomes 
take on five values from 1 to 5, and their IV equivalents for the results presented in the last subsection. In addition, we 
experimented with extending the sample to other countries in Eastern Europe which constituted parts of Russian Empire. 
In particular, we added PSUs in Belarus, Moldova, Lithuania, Estonia, and Poland to the sample. There is no within-
country variation in the Pale dummy for these other countries, but their inclusion into the sample could lead to a higher 
precision in estimating coefficients on control variables, and, therefore, potentially could have affected our results. The 
estimates of the coefficients on the Pale dummy are not affected by the extension of the sample. 
28 Expectations and beliefs of people who face new environments, which is characteristic of migrants, are likely to differ 
from those of the people in stable environments. Swindler (1986) argued that “unsettled” people update beliefs more in 
response to shocks compared to “settled” people. Olson (1982) claimed that stable societies tend to form collusions and 









































In this section, we attempt to discriminate between these two channels. In particular, we identify 
places in Belarus, Lithuania, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine that received new populations settling in spaces 
emptied not, or not only, because Jews were gone but because of mass out-migration of entire ethnic groups 
(mostly, Poles and Germans) after the redrawing of their country borders. We then compare the long-term 
effects of the renewal of the population on outcomes in places where this renewal was associated with the 
mass murder of Jews and where it was associated with Poles and Germans moving out. 
In the sample of six countries: Belarus, Lithuania, Latvia, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine, for each PSU, 
we collected information on ethnic composition for two points in time: 1) at the end of the nineteenth century 
and 2) at the end of the twentieth century. The data were collected at county-level (i.e., the smallest 
administrative unit for which the data are available). The sources are given in the Table A8 of the online Data 
Appendix.  
Based on these data, we construct two variables: one reflecting the change in the ethnic composition 
of the population associated with the disappearance of Jews; the other reflecting the change in the ethnic 
composition of the non-Jewish population. 
As the change in ethnic composition between the Jewish and the Gentile population in settlement s, we take:  
) 1 log( ) 1 log(
XX XIX + − + = Δ s s s j j JG , 
where 
XIX
s j  and
XX
s j  denote the shares of Jews in the total population in settlement s at the end of the 
nineteenth century and at the end of the twentieth century, respectively. Thus,  s JG Δ  is the rate of shrinkage 
of the Jewish population.  
As the Jewish population largely disappeared from Eastern Europe, in 271 out of 291 PSUs this 
measure is positive. It varies from 25% to -0.36%.
29 Only in 2 PSUs in our sample the Jewish population 
                                                 
29 There are 50 PSUs per country in LiTS, we have information on the change in ethnic composition for 299 PSUs in 6 
countries. We were unable to find the ethnic composition at the end of the nineteenth century for one rural PSU currently 
in Zakarpatskaya oblast of Ukraine, which used to belong to Austro-Hungary. We present the analysis for the sample of 
291 PSUs which excludes 8 PSUs in the Far East and Eastern Siberia (this is our baseline sample for Russia). Adding 









































grew by more than 0.3%. On average, the share of the Jewish population shrank by 8.6% (with standard 
deviation of 7%). 
In order to measure the extent of ethnic change among the Gentile population denoted by  GG Δ , we 
first define the majority group in each of the six countries at the end of the 20th century.
30 We call all of the 
Gentile population which does not belong to the Gentile majority group today “Gentile minority.” We 
calculate the shares of the population which belong to the “Gentile minority” (defined as of today) in the total 
Gentile population at the end of nineteenth and end of the twentieth century and denote these two shares by 
XIX
s g and 
XX
s g , respectively. The share of the “Gentile minority” shrank over the last century in 80% of PSUs 
and expanded in 20%. We define a measure of the change in ethnic composition among Gentile groups as 
follows:   
| ) 1 log( ) 1 log( |
XX XIX + − + = Δ s s s g g GG .  
This is the rate of change of the ethnic mix within the Gentile population. The idea is that whenever 
XIX
s g and 
XX
s g  are different, this means that the ethnic mix of non-Jewish groups changed either in favor of the majority 
or in favor of minorities. In both cases this means a renewal of the Gentile population. The growth rate of the 
Gentile minority ( ) 1 log( ) 1 log(
XIX XX + − + s s g g ) varies greatly from -68% to 29%. The rate of renewal of the 
ethnic mix within the non-Jewish population is defined as the absolute value of the growth rate of the Gentile 
minority. It varies from 0% to 68% with the mean value of 14% and standard deviation of 16.
31  
As we already discussed, movements of ethnic groups can be driven by a wide range of different 
factors, many of which cannot be considered exogenous. The Pale can be used as an exogenous source of 
variation in the change between the Jewish and non-Jewish population. In order to estimate the effect of the 
                                                 
30 It is an easy task, as each respective country has today a dominant ethnic group which constitutes the overwhelming 
majority of population (e.g., Russians in Russia, Poles in Poland, or Lithuanians in Lithuania). Note that as the twentieth 
century saw massive movements of populations, the groups that constitute majorities of the population today, were not 
necessarily a majority 100 years ago. 
31 We measure the change in ethnic composition, which is, of course, not necessarily the same as renewal of the 
population. Several areas in Eastern Europe saw a substantial renewal of the population which has nothing to do with the 
change in ethnic composition. For instance, the intensive warfare and the great famine in Ukraine (Golodomor) lead to a 
massive loss of human lives and, arguably, subsequently may have triggered migration into the “emptied areas.” There is 









































ethnic change within the non-Jewish population, we need to find an exogenous source of variation for it as 
well.   
Many historical sources (e.g., Eberhardt, 2003;  Magocsi, 1993; Stola, 1992; Piesowicz 1987) point 
out that the redrawing of country borders after the Second World War and the move of Poland westward on 
the map of Europe triggered massive migrations of particular ethnic groups from areas where they resided for 
centuries. Based on historical evidence, we made a list of places that had mass migrations of entire ethnic 
groups driven by the redrawing of country borders.  First, the so-called “Western Territories” of contemporary 
Poland used to be populated primarily by Germans (since they were part of Germany before the war) and now 
they are populated by Poles.
32 Second and similarly, the German town of Konigsberg (now, Kaliningrad) 
together with the region around it after the war became part of the Soviet Union and experienced a dramatic 
renewal of its population as Germans left and Russians moved in. Third, the territory of the Second Polish 
Republic (SPR) outside contemporary Poland covered parts of Belarus, Lithuania, and Ukraine. These 
territories used to have substantial Polish populations, whereas nowadays they are populated primarily by 
Belarusians, Lithuanians, and Ukrainians in their respective countries. In addition, between the wars, the 
capital of Lithuania, Vilnius, belonged to Poland and Lithuanians moved their capital to the city of Kaunas 
(Kovno), which used to be a rather ethnically diverse town. Kaunas was picked to be the capital because it 
was the second largest city in Lithuania after Vilnius. Once it became the capital, it experienced a mass inflow 
of Lithuanians and there was no migration among other groups that lived in Kaunas. Lithuanians formed an 
overwhelming majority of the place once it became the capital, whereas they were a very small minority 
group before. This new ethnic structure of the population persisted to this day despite the move of the capital 
back to Vilnius after the Second World War. All of these were exogenously predetermined migrations. Thus, 
we create a dummy that equals 1 for all PSUs in Polish Western Territories, the Second Polish Republic 
outside Poland, Kaliningradskaya Oblast (i.e., the region of Konigsberg), and Kaunas and call it “moved 
                                                 
32 The German population in Poland decreased from 3.6 million in 1946 to 0.2 million in 1950. The “Western 
Territories” were mainly populated with Poles coming from central Poland but also with Poles transferred from eastern 
regions of pre-war Poland on the East of the Curzon line, Poles repatriated from Russia, some Ukrainians and 









































country.” Summary statistics for both measures of the renewal of population and for the “moved country” 
instrument are presented in Table A9 in the online Data Appendix. 
Being in “moved country” is a strong predictor of the change among different groups of the Gentile 
population and being in the Pale is a strong predictor of the change between the Gentile and the Jewish 
population. Table 6 presents results of regressions in which we relate our two measures of the change in 
ethnic composition of the population over the last century ( s GG Δ  and  s JG Δ ) to the “in Pale” and ”moved 
country” dummies. Results are presented for regressions at PSU level without any controls (first six 
regressions in each panel) and at the individual level with and without controls. The set of controls includes a 
dummy for the Russian Empire in addition to all other controls that were used in baseline regressions. This is 
because to investigate the channels, we expanded the sample to areas in Poland, Ukraine, and Russia outside 
the Russian Empire. (It is important to note that the “moved country” dummy has variation outside the 
Russian Empire as well as inside the Russian Empire.) Results for all PSUs are in the upper panel of the table 
and for urban and metropolitan PSUs in the lower panel. We verify the robustness of the results to the two 
samples as the change in country borders summarized by the “moved country” dummy must have triggered 
migration of both urban and rural population.  
The “moved country” dummy is highly statistically significant in explaining variation in the change 
in ethnic composition among Gentile groups. Being in “moved country” increases the rate of change within 
the Gentile population by 18 percentage points in the whole sample and 20 percentage points in urban areas. 
In contrast, “in Pale” is not associated with the change within the Gentile population. The change in ethnic 
composition between Jews and non-Jews is significantly related to both “moved country” and “Pale.” This is 
to be expected as all of moved country territories (i.e., PSUs with ”moved country” dummy equal one) are 
entirely to the west of the binding eastern Pale border. The “in Pale” dummy, however, has a substantially 
larger effect in terms of magnitude and statistical significance compared to “moved country” dummy on the 
change in ethnic composition between Jews and non-Jews. The size of the effect of the Pale on the rate of 









































that of “moved country.”  The last row of each panel of Table 6 presents F-statistics for the excluded 
instruments: they are always above 10, and therefore, we do not need to worry about the potential weakness 
of the instruments.  
In order to differentiate between the two channels, we relate our outcomes both to the change within 
the Gentile population and to the change between Jews and Gentiles. If the effect of the Pale were driven by 
the presence of new migrant population, which settled in emptied Jewish houses, we would expect to see a 
similar effect on outcomes of both of these measures, as both of them reflect the extent of new migrant 
population settling in the houses of people who disappeared. (Jews were killed or moved to death camps, 
Poles and Germans moved to their own “moved countries.”) If, in contrast, the effect of the Pale is driven by 
the former Jewish presence in the area, the effects of the two variables should differ. Table 7 presents results 
of the second stage of the 2SLS regressions, where  s GG Δ  and  s JG Δ  are instrumented by “moved country” 
and ”in Pale” dummies. For each outcome, we present results of three regressions: with both  s GG Δ  and 
s JG Δ included as regressors and with each of the two variables included separately.
33 First, we find that the 
effect of the change in ethnic composition from Jews to Gentiles is broadly consistent with our previous 
results on the effect of the Pale. The results are somewhat weaker, than those presented in Table 5, but they 
remain statistically significant in all regressions with only the change in ethnic composition between Jews and 
Gentiles included as regressor with one exception of the support for democracy but only in the sample of all 
PSUs. When we include the change among non-Jewish groups as an additional regressor, the coefficient on 
the change between Jews and Gentiles is significant for all outcomes with the exception of the preference for 
democracy and self-employment in both samples and satisfaction with the economy in the urban sample. 
The most important finding is that the change among non-Jewish groups does not have a significant 
effect on our outcomes, irrespective of whether we include the change in ethnic composition between Jews 
and Gentiles as regressor. Moreover, when both  s GG Δ  and  s JG Δ  are included in the regression, the 
                                                 









































coefficients on them almost always have the opposite sign. This evidence is consistent with only one of the 
two potential channels being at play, namely, that the Pale matters because of Jews. 
To provide further evidence that the effect of the Pale is not driven by new migrant population, we 
compare election results for the anti-market and pro-market parties on the two sides of the border of the 
Second Polish Republic (SPR) within Lithuania and on the two sides of the border of “Western Territories” 
within Poland.
34 Table B3 in the Appendix presents the results of OLS regressions of the vote in an electoral 
district by country for subnational regions with within-region variation in the “moved country” dummy. In 
regressions for Poland, we cluster observations at the level of powiat (second-tier administrative division), as 
there are many electoral districts in each powiat. As in the analysis presented in Table 2, we control for the 
region and election dummies as well as for urban electoral districts and regional centers. If the Pale results 
were driven by the new migrant population, one should have expected to see a higher vote for the socialist 
parties and lower vote for pro-market parties in the “moved country.” This is not the case in the data. In 
Poland, in electoral districts inside the “moved country” there is a significantly lower support for what could 
be called an “anti-market” party compared to electoral districts outside the “moved country.”
35 At the same 
time, there is no significant effect of “moved country” on the pro-market liberal party in Poland. Similarly, in 
Lithuania, there is significantly higher support for pro-market parties inside the “moved country” and no 
significant effect for the socialist party. In all cases, the sign of the effect of “moved country” is the opposite 
to what we found for the Pale. This is consistent with the view that de-rooted population is more dynamic, 
mobile, less conservative, less constrained by traditions, more entrepreneurial, and more pro-market (e.g., 
Olson, 1982).  
                                                 
34 The SPR border also crossed the territories of contemporary Belarus and Ukraine. However, we cannot use election 
data for these countries. As for Ukraine, the border of the SPR exactly coincides with internal borders between different 
regions (subnational units), and therefore, there is no within-region variation in “moved country” in Ukraine. As for 
Belarus, it is not a democracy and there are no political parties independent from the president Alexander Lukashenko. 
35 There is no socialist or communist party in Poland. The only party which calls itself leftist (Alliance of Democratic 
Left, SLD) is a very pro-European, pro-market party. Among the two big right-wing parties, Law and Justice (PiS) is a 
pro-government-intervention party, in opposition to the Civic Platform (PO) party, which, in turn, has a pro-market and 
pro-liberal political agenda. We compare votes for PiS (as the anti-market party) and PO (as the pro-market party). We 










































To sum up, the evidence presented in this section brings us to the conclusion that the Pale matters 
because Jews lived there before and not because new migrants occupied emptied space when the Jews were 
gone. 
6. Mechanisms driving the effect of the Pale 
Acemoglu et al. (2010) argue that the Holocaust destroyed the middle class as Jews were disproportionally 
represented in the middle class of the society. In our analysis, the border of the Pale of Settlement can be 
interpreted as a proxy for the intensity of the Holocaust.
36 The destruction of the middle class can, indeed, 
explain some of our results. The extermination of Jews must have had a pure composition effect, namely, it 
biased the population towards less liberal values (which usually are shared to a larger extent by the middle 
class) and towards less entrepreneurship as the Jews were more likely to be entrepreneurs inside the Pale. 
However, the composition effect, due to the middle class having been destroyed by the Holocaust inside the 
Pale, is insufficient to explain all of the observed facts. In particular, it cannot explain the robustly higher trust 
inside the Pale compared to outside the Pale as there is no obvious association between the middle class and 
trust.  In addition, it seems that the magnitude of the differences between the middle class in and out of the 
Pale today is not sufficiently high to explain the sizeable difference in anti-market attitudes of the residents of 
the Pale. Figure B5 presents kernel density estimates for the measures of relative income and consumption, 
available in LiTS, for residents of urban PSUs within 140 kilometers of the Pale border in Latvia, Russia, and 
Ukraine, separately for PSUs inside and outside the Pale. The figure shows that a smaller share of respondents 
positions themselves on the 5
th to the 8
th step of the 10-step income ladder and that consumption density has 
wider tales inside the Pale compared to outside the Pale. Yet, these differences are small in magnitude and 
statistically insignificant: Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions does not reject the 
null hypothesis of equal distributions; F-test for equality of standard deviations does not reject the null 
                                                 
36 Acemoglu at al. (2010) find that the intensity of the Holocaust is associated with lower population growth and higher 
political support for communists in cities inside Russia and lower per capita incomes measured at the oblast level in 
Russia. At the same time, they find no effect on education. Consistent with Acemoglu at al. (2010), we find higher 
political support for communist/socialist parties inside the Pale and no effect on education. Unlike Acemoglu at al. 
(2010), we find no significant effect on city growth or per capita consumption level. This, however, could be a 









































hypothesis of equal standard deviations.
37 These pieces of evidence are insufficient to reject the “removal of 
the middle class” as one of the possible underlying mechanisms of the Pale effect because consumption and 
relative income may be measured poorly. Yet, this mechanism is certainly insufficient since it does not have 
any prediction about trust.  
Below we suggest and test for a mechanism which predicts both higher trust and lower market 
support inside the Pale, namely, the development of a persistent anti-market culture and bonding trust among 
the non-Jewish population rooted in ethnic animosity towards Jews. Before the Second World War, Jews and 
non-Jews lived in the urban areas of the Pale and “feared and despised each other, and continued to live as 
‘two solitudes’” (Aster and Potichnyj 1983). The two groups were organized into two internally coherent 
communities, with different traditions, prohibitions, mythology, language, beliefs and values and were 
engaged in little interaction beyond market transactions. The presence of Jews created a challenge for the non-
Jewish population as Jews were dominating in several important economic niches which the non-Jewish 
community aspired to control but failed in competition with the Jews. This created demand for ethnic hatred 
on the part of the non-Jewish population (see Glaeser 2005 on the theory of the demand and supply of hatred). 
Indeed, the relationship between the two communities was dominated by animosity and suspicion often 
resulting in open outbursts of ethnic hatred and, sometimes, pogroms.
38  
The close co-existence with the Jews created pressure within the non-Jewish population inside the 
Pale to develop strong ties of loyalty in their community in response and in opposition to strong ties within 
                                                 
37 To check whether this is also true conditionally on our covariates, we created dummies for whether each respondent 
belongs to the middle class, defined as being on the 6
th, 7
th or 8
th step on the self-reported income ladder, or alternatively, 
as being in the 6
th, 7
th or 8
th decile of the consumption distribution taken jointly for inside and outside of the Pale. Using 
these variables as dependent variables, we ran regressions similar to our baseline analysis of the effect of the Pale 
(equations 1 and 2) conditional on all controls with the exception of consumption and found no statistically significant 
difference between the middle class size on two sides of the Pale border. These results are reported in table B4 in the 
Appendix. 
38 Slezkine (2002) describes the relations between the majority of the Pale Jews and their customers as follows: “Each 
side saw the other as unclean, opaque, dangerous, contemptible, and ultimately irrelevant to the communal past and 
future salvation … Most Jewish and non-Jewish inhabitants of the Pale of Settlement shared the same fundamental view 
of what separated them. …they tended to think of each other as universal and mutually complementary opposites: mind 
versus body, head versus heart, outsider versus insider, nomadic versus settled” (pp. 106-107). See also Hoffman (1997) 
who relied on one of shtetls’ Memory Book to provide evidence of ethnic animosity between the two groups. Jews were 
accused by Gentiles of all sorts of wrongdoings from economic exploitation to ritual murders (Dubnow 1920; Tokarska-









































the Jewish community, which are a part of traditional Jewish culture. This type of internal trust, limited to a 
close and homogenous group of people belonging to the same community or to a closed social network is 
known as “bonding” (rather than “bridging”) social capital (Fukuyama 1995, Putnam 2000, Tabellini 2008).
39 
In the face of the rival group (i.e., Jews), the Gentile population not only united and consolidated, but also 
developed values that are contrary to those that the Jewish group was associated with. Since Jews represented 
a liberal pro-market force because of their traditional occupations, ethnic animosity contributed to the 
development of an anti-market culture among the Gentile population in opposition to the Jews. Gentiles 
developed a social stigma against what Jews were associated with in their eyes, and in particular, against the 
market and market-making activities which were traditionally Jewish and in which they failed to compete 
against the Jews.
40  
The development of within-group trust and an anti-market culture amongst the non-Jewish population 
was a response to the challenge of co-existence with Jews and was a special characteristic of the Gentile 
population inside the Pale, as outside the Pale the local population with the same ethnic and religious 
background was not subjected to similar social pressures as it had no experience of living with Jews side-by-
side. We argue that the differences in attitudes and trust that we observe today between residents on the two 
sides of the Pale border are a consequence of the persistent anti-market culture and bonding within-group ties 
developed during two centuries of co-existence of Jews and Gentiles inside the Pale in the Russian Empire. 
The anti-market culture manifests itself in the anti-market and anti-transition sentiment, higher support for 
socialist and communist parties, and low entrepreneurship, while bonding ties manifest themselves in higher 
trust within the Pale.    
As the rival group (Jews) disappeared during the Holocaust, within-group trust became empirically 
indistinguishable from generalized trust based on the question about whether most people can be trusted 
(available in LiTS survey).
41 Respondents, when they are asked this question, think about people they 
                                                 
39 Also see Greif and Tabellini (2010); Foley and Edwards (1998), and Portes (1998).  
40 This argument has some parallels to the phenomenon of the social stigma against ‘acting white’ among the US black 
population (Fordham and Ogbu 1986; Tyson et al. 2005). 









































encounter in their ordinary life and in a homogenous society these are the members of their own group (Bahry 
et al., 2005). Since the population of the Pale became homogenous when the Jews were killed, positive 
answers to trust question reflect within-group trust inside the Pale.  
There is, unfortunately, no question on attitudes towards representatives of other ethnic groups which 
would have allowed disentangling bonding from bridging trust directly. The LiTS questionnaire does contain 
the question about membership in voluntary civic organizations (similar to questions used as proxies for 
bridging social capital in Knack and Keefer 1997, Glaeser et al. 2002 and Beugelsdijk and Smulders 2009).
42 
The number of respondents who are members of voluntary civic organizations, however, turns out to be too 
small for proper econometric inference. In our baseline sample (e.g., urban and metropolitan settlements in 
Latvia, Ukraine, and Western Russia) there are only 59 members of voluntary civic organizations among 1839 
respondents who answered this question. 50 of these 59 live outside the Pale. Thus, inside the Pale 1.45% of 
respondents are members of civic organizations compared to 4.10% outside the Pale. Membership in civic 
organizations is also significantly lower inside the Pale in OLS regressions with all controls; but the number 
of observations with positive responses close to the Pale border on either side is insufficient for regression 
discontinuity analysis. This suggestive evidence is consistent with our interpretation of the fact that residents 
of urban areas inside the Pale have more trust compared to those outside the Pale as an expression of higher 
bonding (rather than bridging) social capital within the Pale. Furthermore, the fact that we do not find a 
positive effect of the Pale on average consumption or other economic outcomes, despite higher trust in the 
Pale, is also consistent with the conjecture that the observed higher trust in the Pale is bonding in nature as 
strong within-group ties are not as productive as weak between-group ties (Granovetter 1973, 2005). In 
addition, as generalized trust is usually positively correlated with trust in institutions, we checked and found 
no statistical association between the Pale, on the one hand, and the survey responses about trust in various 
institutions such as the banking sector, foreign investors, government, parliament, courts, or political parties, 
                                                 
42 The exact formulation of the question is: “Are you a member of other [than political parties] civic/voluntary 









































on the other hand (for the relationship between generalized trust and trust in institutions, see for instance, La 
Porta et al. 1997 and Aghion et al. 2009).
43 
  A testable implication of the suggested mechanism, which allows us to distinguish it from the pure 
composition effect discussed above, is that in places with historically higher ethnic animosity Gentile group 
should have developed stronger within-group trust and stronger anti-Jewish, and hence, anti-market culture. 
Therefore, if this mechanism is at play, we should observe higher anti-market sentiment and higher trust today 
in places where anti-Semitism was historically stronger, even controlling for the historical presence of Jews in 
the population. In order to test this prediction, using historical sources and archival information we collected 
coordinates of 527 anti-Jewish pogroms, which constitute a complete list of major pogroms that took place in 
former territories of the Russian Empire in Eastern Europe between 1821 and 1946. We describe the 
definition and the sources in detail in the Data Appendix A10 and present the map of pogroms in Figure B6 in 
Appendix B. Using these data, we constructed distance to the nearest pogrom for each PSU in the Russian 
Empire in Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine. About a third of PSUs 
in our sample are located within one kilometer from a place of pogrom; the median distance to pogrom is 22.6 
kilometers (with mean of 79, standard deviation of 123, minimum of zero, and maximum of 809 kilometers). 
Under the assumption that the proximity to places of major pogroms reflects the extent of historical 
anti-Jewish animosity of local non-Jewish population, the prediction of our mechanism can be restated as 
follows: in two settlements with the same historical share of Jewish population, respondents located further 
away from pogroms should exhibit lower anti-market culture and lower bonding trust. This effect should also 
be perceptible within the Pale of Settlement. We test this prediction by regressing our outcomes from the LiTs 
survey on the distance to the closest pogrom conditional on the share of Jews in this location in 1897, Pale 
dummy, and our standard list of covariates. We take log(distance+10) in order to take into account the fact 
                                                 
43 Even though the persistence of higher (bonding) trust and of the anti-market culture is related to the previous presence 
of the Jews, the Holocaust could have further reinforced this effect. First, witnessing the Holocaust did not leave the 
local population unaffected: assistance to killings, humiliations, murders could have contributed to even stronger anti-
Jewish attitudes as a built-in self-justification psychological mechanism. Second, as Gross (2004) suggested, the 
persistence of anti-Semitism in places where Jews used to live can also be explained by the fear of the non-Jewish 










































that distances to pogroms should matter less once they are large.
44 We find significant and robust results (to 
variation in samples and the list of controls) for two outcomes only: preference for market and trust. These 
results are consistent with the prediction of our mechanism: preference towards market is getting larger and 
trust is getting smaller as the distance to pogroms increases. Regression results for these two outcomes are 
reported in Table 8. The first four regressions for each outcome present results with no additional controls 
apart from our standard set of controls, then, we add the percent of Jews in 1897 and the Pale dummy as 
additional covariates separately and together. The last two regressions for each outcome confine the sample to 
PSUs inside the Pale only, and repeat the analysis. In all specifications, we find a significant positive 
coefficient on the distance to pogroms for preference towards market and a significant negative coefficient on 
distance to pogroms for trust.
45 A one standard deviation increase in the log distance to pogroms reduces anti-
market attitudes and trust by about ¼ of their respective standard deviations. There are no robust results for 
other outcomes, namely, for the preference towards democracy, the assessment of the economy overall and 
compared to 1989 and entrepreneurship. However, the preference for market and trust are our best available 
measures of anti-market culture and bonding trust, and therefore, we conclude that this evidence is supportive 
of our suggested mechanism.  
A subsidiary question arises, which is necessary for understanding the mechanism. How can one 
reconcile two seemingly contradictory facts: on the one hand, in the eyes of the non-Jewish population in the 
Pale the Jews were seen as promoters of capitalism and market culture; on the other hand, they played a major 
role in the revolutionary movements of the twentieth century?  First, it is clear that only a small part of the 
Jewish population was involved in the revolutionary movement; the biggest part remained attached to the 
religious tradition. As far as the minority attracted by communism is concerned, historians (e.g., Slezkine 
2004, Schatz 1991, Gerrits 2009) often point out that Jews (just as other discriminated ethnic minorities) were 
                                                 
44 This variable ranges from 2.3 to 6.71, with mean of 3.73 and SD of 1.24. 
45 Here we present results for trust measured from 1 to 5, as this measure gives us a little bit stronger results due to larger 
variation compared to the trust dummy used in the previous analysis. If we use trust dummy instead of trust which varies 
from 1 to 5, results in regressions with Pale as control variable become statistically insignificant, but the coefficient 
remains negative. In all regressions presented up to this point, the results are completely robust to using either trust 









































attracted to the revolutionary movement because it promised them universalism, justice, liberation and, in 
particular, equality of ethnic groups.  In addition, the communist movement offered, especially to younger 
Jews, an opportunity to escape from the highly restrictive religious traditions of closed shtetl communities and 
parental authority. Therefore, there is no contradiction between the pro-market culture present in the big part 
of the Jewish population and radical engagement of a relatively small part of it. Moreover, the motivations of 
the Jews who actively supported radical movements were unrelated to the Bolsheviks’ political agenda with 
regard to market or state ownership.
46 The main economic slogan of Bolsheviks’ populist political campaign 
at the time of the revolutionary movement was about the redistribution in favor of workers and peasants (i.e., 
“Factories to workers; land to peasants”) rather than about the rejection of markets.  Overall, there is not 
necessarily a contradiction between the common perception of Jews as agents of capitalism and their 
participation in the revolution.
47  
7. Robustness 
Our analysis relies on spatial cross-sectional variation and, as is typical for this kind of analysis, we need to 
worry about confounding factors that may be correlated with the Pale border. First, it is important to note that 
the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (1569-1795), characterized by good institutions such as strict checks 
on monarchical power and ethnic and religious tolerance (uncommon among Eastern European states at that 
time) occupied much of the same territories as the Pale. Figure B7 in the online Auxiliary Results Appendix 
shows the borders of the Pale and of the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth on the same map. There are two 
places on the map (in Russia and Ukraine) where the borders almost coincide; however, there are also 
territories with variation in the Pale both completely inside the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (such as all 
                                                 
46 Other political parties of the beginning of the 20
th century that also were promising equality and liberation to the Jews 
were socialist; and there was no viable pro-market alternative. 
47 Kopstein and Wittenberg (2003) provide systematic evidence that over-representation of Jews in the Communist party 
at the beginning of the 20
th century should not be equated with Jewish mass political support for communist. They show 
that about 93 percent of Jewish voters supported noncommunist parties in 1922 and 1928 Polish national parliamentary 
elections and only around 14 percent of the communists' electoral support came from Jews. Later on, during the 
sovietization of the Pale territories, Jews often suffered just as the non-Jewish population from such policies as 










































of Latvia) and completely outside the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth (namely, Southern Ukraine). In order 
to verify that our results are not driven by the omitted Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth border effect, we 
conduct two exercises: first, we include a dummy for the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth as an additional 
control variable; second, we re-estimate all the results separately for Latvia (there are not enough urban PSUs 
in South Ukraine outside the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth to run regressions). In both cases, we find 
that our results are robust. Table B5 presents results for the sample of three countries with the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth dummy as an additional control variable. The results are very similar to the 
baseline presented in Table 3 both in terms of magnitude and statistical significance. The Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth dummy, in contrast, is rarely significant. Table B6 in the Appendix presents results for Latvia 
only. As there is not enough variation in distance to PSUs in Latvia to estimate controlled function RD 
regression, we run simple OLS and reduced sample regressions (for PSUs 70 and 35 km from the border, as 
all urban and metropolitan PSUs in Latvia are at most 140 kilometers from the border and therefore simple 
OLS and sample 140 coincide). We also adopt a more parsimonious set of controls for Latvia excluding 
geographical controls as there is little variation in them. As shown in the Table, the results are robust for all 
outcomes with the exception of self-employment. Overall, we conclude that it is unlikely that our results are 
driven by the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth.
48 
Our baseline set of controls includes elevation (because PSUs inside the Pale are significantly higher 
than outside the Pale, although the magnitude of the difference is not substantial, namely, 79 meters) and 
longitude (because the West is generally more pro-market than the East). But we also verified that none of the 
other geographical variables affect our results. In particular, the inclusion of latitude, temperature, 
evaporation, and precipitation, which may proxy for the quality of the land, does not affect our results or add 
explanatory power to our regressions. 
In addition, we conducted two kinds of placebo experiments. First, we hypothetically shifted the 
border of the Pale and estimated RD at the “shifted border.” In particular, we defined the set of placebo pale 
                                                 
48 It is worth noting that it would be hard to reconcile the “anti-market culture” effects that we found with the Polish-
Lithuanian Commonwealth (PLC). A priori, only the trust result may have been driven by PLC. Yet, our robustness 









































dummies, which equal to one when the distance to the true pale border is 225, 200, 150, 100, 50, -50, -75, -
100, -150, and  -225 kilometers. The negative values indicate distances to the Pale border for PSUs outside 
the Pale. The thresholds were chosen in a way that a sufficient number of PSUs switched their position in 
each of the “placebo Pales” compared to the actual Pale and to the other “placebo Pales.” For these placebo 
Pale dummies, we re-estimated our regressions. The first column of Table B7 in the online Auxiliary Results 
Appendix summarizes the results. Overall, only in one third of regressions the coefficient at the placebo Pale 
dummy was of the same sign as our main results. In 8.3 percent of placebo regressions the coefficients on the 
“placebo Pale” dummies are significant at the 10percent level and have the same sign as the benchmark. In 
3.3 percent of placebo regressions, we found the coefficient at placebo Pale dummy significant at the 5 
percent level, and in 1.7 percent - significant at the 1 percent level. As we rely on cross-sectional geographical 
variation and all settlements are different and located at some non-trivial distance from each other, it is not 
surprising that we find some statistically significant results in placebo regressions; yet, their number with the 
predicted sign is sufficiently small for us to conclude that it is highly unlikely that our results are a random 
realization. 
Second, our baseline regressions control for longitude linearly. Yet, one could argue that this is a too 
restrictive functional form. In order to find out whether longitude could have driven our results (in case we 
did not control for it flexibly enough) we conduct an additional placebo experiment, in which instead of the 
effect of Pale dummy we estimate an effect of having longitude below 30, 32, 34, 36, and 38. The results are 
presented in the second column of Table B4. Again in the majority of placebo regressions, the coefficient at 
the placebo treatment has the opposite sign compared to baseline regressions. We find the significant at (at 
least) 10%  level effect of meridians with the same sign as baseline in 6.7% of placebo regressions; at 5% 
level effect -- in 3.3% of placebo regressions; and there were no regressions with significance at 1% level.  
The two placebo exercises suggest that our standard errors might be biased downwards. However, 










































Current residents of the Pale (if compared to their counterparts outside the Pale) vote less for pro-market 
liberal political parties and more for socialist anti-market parties, have lower support for the market and 
democracy, are less engaged in entrepreneurship, but exhibit higher levels of trust. At the same time, the Pale 
has no lasting effects on average consumption, income, or education levels. These effects are related to the 
former presence of Jews rather than the inflow of new migrant population into the formerly-Jewish areas. 
During several centuries of Jewish presence in Eastern Europe, the non-Jewish population, that lived side-by-
side with Jews, developed a particular anti-market culture and within group loyalty, both fueled by ethnic 
animosity. This culture persisted despite the disappearance of the group that was central to its formation. The 
Pale of Settlement and the Holocaust have tangible consequences for political and social development of 
Eastern Europe today. 
Broader implications emerge from our analysis. Attitudes and beliefs formed in a distant past by a 
series of historical accidents can persist in the long-run and may have an important effect on political choices 
many decades later. Our interpretation of the presented evidence also suggests that the co-existence of hostile 
ethnic or religious groups in close proximity not only has an effect on attitudes of the representatives of these 
groups about each other, but also can affect the group identity and self-perception of group representatives. In 
particular, one group may define itself in opposition to a rival, especially when the rival has easily observed 
special inalienable characteristics. Furthermore, social interaction within groups changes in the presence of a 
rival group, as group members develop within-group loyalty.  
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Table 1. Percentage of Jewish population in and outside the Pale in provinces adjacent to the border of the Pale (1897 Census) 
 
Mean Min Max Mean Min Max
% of Jewish population in provinces 0.68 0.17 1.83 7.48 3.97 12.06
% of Jewish population in uezds (sub-province administrative units) 0.47 0.00 4.67 6.80 0.89 22.28
% of Jewish population in cenral uezds of each province 1.83 0.01 4.67 13.98 5.10 22.28
% of Jews in provincial large cities 4.12 1.42 6.44 37.15 25.97 52.37
Outside the Pale Inside the Pale
(7 provinces, 76 uezds) (5 provinces, 60 uezds)  
 
Note: Provinces outside the Pale and adjacent to the border: Donskaya, Kharkovskaya, Kurskaya, Livliandskaya, Orovskaya, Pskovskaya, and Smolenskaya. 
Provinces inside the Pale and adjacent to the border: Chernigovskaya, Ekaterinoslavskaya, Mogilevskaya, Poltavskaya, and Vitebskaya. We exclude Courland 










































Table 2. Election results. OLS. 
Countries in the sample
In Pale 12.297** 11.916*** 11.823** 5.251** 5.837*** 6.572*** 2.165 3.271 3.315
[5.007] [4.363] [4.690] [2.554] [2.208] [2.169] [2.676] [2.509] [2.860]
On the border 2.407 4.276* 4.285* 3.797** 4.530*** 4.663*** 4.216 2.942 3.483
[2.650] [2.146] [2.210] [1.489] [1.339] [1.304] [2.602] [2.549] [2.559]
Town 8.247** 8.523** 1.519 1.473 -4.294* -4.272*
[3.196] [3.194] [2.475] [2.472] [2.393] [2.455]
Regional center 1.026 7.442 -5.897***
[2.971] [8.372] [1.575]
Observations 90 90 83 360 360 348 165 165 125
R-squared 0.670 0.725 0.707 0.600 0.616 0.661 0.717 0.737 0.711
Regional center excluded Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Regions with variation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Countries in the sample
In Pale -6.453** -6.325*** -6.670*** -1.485* -0.564 -0.612* 0.915 0.743 2.089
[2.426] [2.314] [2.461] [0.822] [0.438] [0.367] [2.212] [2.331] [2.568]
On the border -0.535 -1.449 -1.599 -2.245*** -0.992** -1.154*** -1.470 -1.278 -0.613
[1.322] [1.226] [1.207] [0.556] [0.455] [0.420] [2.347] [2.274] [2.196]
Town -2.997 -3.331 3.074*** 3.073*** 1.652 1.105
[2.046] [2.005] [0.686] [0.699] [1.994] [2.060]
Regional center -3.043 10.980** 0.864
[2.011] [4.934] [1.743]
Observations 90 90 83 360 360 348 165 165 125
R-squared 0.702 0.731 0.722 0.149 0.424 0.393 0.693 0.694 0.704
Regional center excluded Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes No Yes
Regions with variation Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Percent of vote for communist/socialist/anti-market parties in a district
Latvia Russia Ukraine
Latvia Russia Ukraine
Percent of vote for market-reform parties in a district
 
Note: Election and region dummies are included in the list of covariates in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by electoral district. 









































Table 3. The Pale and contemporary attitudes in urban and metropolitan areas. Sample: Urban and metropolitan PSUs in Latvia, Ukraine, and 
Russia 
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
In Pale -0.182 -0.152 -0.179 -0.044 -0.196 -0.169 -0.158 -0.235 -0.186 -0.257
[0.050]*** [0.064]** [0.077]** [0.104] [0.069]*** [0.060]*** [0.066]** [0.073]*** [0.090]* [0.086]***
Observations 1833 996 837 237 1833 1832 996 837 237 1832
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.12 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.12 0.11
PSUs in Pale 31 11 9 6 31 31 11 9 6 31
PSUs outside Pale 61 39 33 6 61 61 39 33 6 61
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
In Pale -0.383 -0.454 -0.363 -0.35 -0.562 -0.209 -0.368 -0.409 -0.118 -0.388
[0.183]** [0.171]** [0.262] [0.319] [0.247]** [0.127] [0.120]*** [0.156]** [0.291] [0.171]**
Observations 1646 908 759 224 1646 1741 955 804 228 1741
R-squared 0.19 0.2 0.22 0.14 0.21 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.13
PSUs in Pale 31 11 9 6 31 31 11 9 6 31
PSUs outside Pale 61 39 33 6 61 61 39 33 6 61
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
In Pale -0.067 -0.092 -0.129 0.008 -0.113 0.192 0.222 0.219 0.179 0.293
[0.034]* [0.050]* [0.062]** [0.057] [0.047]** [0.047]*** [0.061]*** [0.064]*** [0.094]* [0.084]***
Observations 1057 572 486 143 1057 1803 988 829 232 1803
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.03 0.06 0.05 0.09 0.05
PSUs in Pale 31 11 9 6 31 31 11 9 6 31
PSUs outside Pale 61 39 33 6 61 61 39 33 6 61
Urban and metropolitan settlements
Economic situation better in 2006 than in 1989 Satisfaction with present state of economy
Prefer market to planed economy Prefer democracy to autocratic regime
Self-employment Trust
 
Note: For each dependent variable we present five regressions: OLS, three reduced sample regressions with the distance to the border of the Pale below 140, 70 
and 35 km, and RD regression, which includes two polynomials of distance on both sides of the border in the list of covariates. List of controls includes country 
dummies, metropolitan area dummy, religious fractionalization, Western Ukraine dummy (in OLS and RD regression), longitude, elevation, gender, age (with a 
quadratic term), education level dummies, consumption, employment status dummies, ethnic minority dummy, and religion dummies. In sample 35, we exclude 









































Table 4. The Pale and contemporary attitudes in rural areas. Sample: Rural PSUs in Latvia, Ukraine, Russia 
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
In Pale 0.097 0.22 0.278 0.331 0.137 0.17 0.142 0.065 0.033 0.308
[0.079] [0.091]** [0.112]** [0.155]* [0.130] [0.090]* [0.100] [0.082] [0.171] [0.105]***
Observations 858 419 339 160 858 858 419 339 160 858
R-squared 0.09 0.08 0.11 0.21 0.11 0.08 0.08 0.1 0.13 0.14
PSUs in Pale 15 5 5 3 15 15 5 5 3 15
PSUs outside Pale 28 16 12 5 28 28 16 12 5 28
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
In Pale -0.2 0.379 0.253 1.083 -0.424 -0.11 0.204 0.246 0.146 -0.151
[0.311] [0.106]*** [0.177] [0.256]*** [0.239]* [0.285] [0.174] [0.249] [0.481] [0.227]
Observations 804 396 318 152 804 823 411 331 159 823
R-squared 0.18 0.15 0.18 0.16 0.25 0.14 0.06 0.08 0.16 0.2
PSUs in Pale 15 5 5 3 15 15 5 5 3 15
PSUs outside Pale 28 16 12 5 28 28 16 12 5 28
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
In Pale 0.009 -0.088 -0.197 -0.434 0.028 0.023 -0.092 -0.245 -0.601 0.081
[0.028] [0.092] [0.107]* [0.092]*** [0.069] [0.101] [0.106] [0.115]** [0.025]*** [0.135]
Observations 421 208 167 79 421 842 414 334 156 842
R-squared 0.1 0.19 0.23 0.42 0.12 0.06 0.1 0.1 0.26 0.08
PSUs in Pale 15 5 5 3 15 15 5 5 3 15
PSUs outside Pale 28 16 12 5 28 28 16 12 5 28
Self-employment Trust
Prefer market to planed economy Prefer democracy to autocratic regime
Economic situation better in 2006 than in 1989 Satisfaction with present state of economy
Rural settlements
 
Note: For each dependent variable we present five regressions: OLS, three reduced sample regressions with the distance to the border of the Pale below 140, 70 
and 35 km, and RD regression, which includes two polynomials of distance on both sides of the border in the list of covariates. List of controls includes country 
dummies, metropolitan area dummy, religious fractionalization, Western Ukraine dummy (in OLS and RD regression), longitude, elevation, gender, age (with a 
quadratic term), education level dummies, consumption, employment status dummies, ethnic minority dummy, and religion dummies. In sample 35, we exclude 












































Table 5. The Pale and the percentage of Jewish population in the Russian Empire. The second 
stage. 
Panel A
level: psu individual psu individual psu individual
In Pale 0.08 0.082 0.276 0.268 0.067 0.082
[0.012]*** [0.015]*** [0.037]*** [0.034]*** [0.017]*** [0.026]***
Observations 92 1834 80 1594 43 858
R-squared 0.46 0.62 0.55 0.73 0.38 0.56
Controls No Yes No Yes No Yes
F-stat (exc. Instrument) 46.4 29.99 56.58 63.29 15.75 10.12
% of Jews in uezd, 1897 -1.989 -1.921 -5.044
[0.743]*** [0.863]** [1.935]**
% of Jews in settlement, 1897 -0.662 -0.67 -1.54
[0.170]*** [0.215]*** [0.699]**
Observations 1833 1593 1832 1592 1646 1429
R-squared 0.08 0.1 0.05 0.07 0.16 0.16
% of Jews in uezd, 1897 -2.699 -0.76 1.999
[1.325]** [0.407]* [0.660]***
% of Jews in settlement, 1897 -0.963 -0.246 0.593
[0.475]** [0.128]* [0.168]***
Observations 1741 1514 1057 932 1803 1564
R-squared 0.1 0.1 0.02 0.01 0.04
PSUs in Pale 31 28 31 28 31 28











% of Jews in uezd, 1897 1.187 2.077 -2.414 -1.351 0.12 0.29
[0.938] [1.135]* [3.840] [3.438] [0.412] [1.263]
Observations 858 858 804 823 421 842
R-squared 0.09 0.07 0.17 0.14 0.1 0.06
Trust
IV, 2nd stage, rural PSUs





1st stage, urban and metropolitan settlements
1st stage, rural 
settlements
% of Jews in uezd, 1897 % of Jews in uezd, 1897
% of Jews in settlement, 
1897
IV, 2nd stage, urban and metropolitan PSUs
Satisfaction with economy Self-employment
  
Note: Countries in the sample: Latvia, Ukraine, and Russia. % of Jews in 1897 variables are instrumented by 
“in Pale” dummy. List of controls includes country dummies, religious fractionalization, Western Ukraine 
dummy, gender, age (with a quadratic term), education level dummies, consumption, employment status 
dummies, ethnic minority dummy, and religion dummies. Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters at PSU 

















































Moved country 0.181 0.182 0.047 0.033 0.122 0.021
[0.029]*** [0.029]*** [0.010]*** [0.007]*** [0.027]***[0.007]***
In Pale 0.01 -0.005 0.106 0.103 0.099 0.073
[0.019] [0.017] [0.005]*** [0.005]*** [0.026]***[0.011]***
Controls No No No No No No All All
Observations 291 291 291 291 291 291 5806 5806
R-squared 0.19 0.00 0.19 0.07 0.56 0.59 0.49 0.69
F (Moved country) 40.17 40.22 20.67 23.08 20.86 9.51
F (Pale) 0.29 0.09 423.72 387.36 14.18 40.63






Moved country 0.201 0.199 0.056 0.033 0.107 0.027
[0.034]*** [0.034]*** [0.012]*** [0.008]*** [0.030]***[0.008]***
In Pale 0.036 0.01 0.112 0.108 0.103 0.08
[0.024] [0.021] [0.006]*** [0.007]*** [0.032]***[0.014]***
Controls No No No No No No All All
Observations 193 193 193 193 193 193 3848 3848
R-squared 0.24 0.01 0.24 0.09 0.59 0.63 0.57 0.74
F (Moved country) 35.24 33.54 20.91 16.12 12.5 11.52
F (Pale) 2.29 0.21 323.44 268.55 10.08 35.25
F (Both) 17.45 266.38 10.61 24.44
Change in ethnic composition:
PSU level regressions
among Gentile groups Jews vs. Gentiles
Individual level;    
PSU clusters
Individual level;    
PSU clusters
All PSUs (including rural)
Change in ethnic composition:
among Gentile groups Jews vs. Gentiles
PSU level regressions
Urban and metropolitan settlements
|Note: Moved country is the dummy that equals 1 for all PSUs in Polish Western Territories, Second Polish Republic 
outside Poland, the region of Konigsberg and Kaunas. The sample includes countries with variation in at least one of the 
two instruments: Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia (if we include Estonia and Moldova with no 
variation in instruments, the results are the same). We include Russian Empire in the list of control variables as now we 
include in the sample parts of Poland, Lithuania and Russia outside the Russian Empire. The list of other controls 
includes country dummies, religious fractionalization, Western Ukraine dummy, gender, age (with a quadratic term), 
education level dummies, consumption, employment status dummies, ethnic minority dummy, and religion dummies.  
Robust standard errors are in brackets, we adjust them for clusters at PSU level in individual-level regressions. *** 










































Table 7. Channels, the second stage  
Second stage, IV
Change b/w Jews and Gentiles -2.094 -1.152 -0.905 -0.557 -5.981 -4.551
[1.243]* [0.647]* [1.188] [0.729] [2.797]** [1.740]***
Change among  Gentile groups 0.662 0.276 0.244 0.078 1.047 -0.07
[0.521] [0.312] [0.481] [0.329] [1.146] [0.631]
Observations 5799 5799 5799 5799 5799 5799 5179 5179 5179
R-squared 0.03 0.08 0.08 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.11 0.14 0.17
Change b/w Jews and Gentiles -3.395 -3.172 -1.151 -0.627 1.799 1.646
[1.954]* [1.225]** [0.755] [0.321]* [1.040]* [0.617]***
Change among  Gentile groups 0.158 -0.459 0.374 0.098 -0.105 0.222
[0.800] [0.518] [0.392] [0.229] [0.433] [0.287]
Observations 5533 5533 5533 3020 3020 3020 5691 5691 5691
R-squared 0.15 0.15 0.17 0.02 0.06 0.05 0.01 0.01 0.02
Second stage, IV
Change b/w Jews and Gentiles -3.774 -2.025 -2.041 -1.557 -6.817 -4.464
[2.243]* [0.796]** [1.893] [0.881]* [4.560] [2.188]**
Change among  Gentile groups 1.165 0.152 0.322 -0.225 1.676 -0.209
[1.012] [0.397] [0.881] [0.447] [2.100] [0.822]
Observations 3845 3845 3845 3845 3845 3845 3376 3376 3376
R-squared 0.09 0.07 0.09 0.03 0.04 0.06 0.12 0.16 0.18
Change b/w Jews and Gentiles -2.902 -2.846 -2.245 -0.695 3.364 2.425
[2.902] [1.480]* [1.665] [0.375]* [1.859]* [0.722]***
Change among  Gentile groups 0.037 -0.698 1.058 0.349 -0.621 0.28
[1.312] [0.729] [0.843] [0.287] [0.834] [0.360]
Observations 3662 3662 3662 2140 2140 2140 3767 3767 3767
R-squared 0.15 0.16 0.16 0.03 0.02 0.02
All PSUs (including rural settlements)
Prefer market Prefer democracy Econ. situation compared to 1989
Satisfaction with the economy Self-employment Trust
Urban and metropolitan settlements
Prefer market Prefer democracy Econ. situation compared to 1989
Satisfaction with the economy Self-employment Trust
 
Note: The sample includes countries with variation in at least one of the two instruments: Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, and Russia (if we include Estonia and 
Moldova with no variation in instruments, results are the same).The list of controls includes dummy for Russian Empire, country dummies, religious fractionalization, Western 
Ukraine dummy, gender, age (with a quadratic term), education level dummies, consumption, employment status dummies, ethnic minority dummy, and religion dummies. Robust 










































Table 8. Distance to pogroms, trust and anti-market culture. 
   Prefer market 
   Whole sample     PSUs within pale 
Log (distance to pogroms+10)  0.0405  0.0429  0.0281  0.0314     0.0451  0.0478 
   [0.0151]***  [0.0167]**  [0.0153]*  [0.0161]*     [0.0225]**  [0.0249]* 
Percent of Jews in uezd, 1897     0.170     0.384        0.158 
      [0.385]     [0.398]        [0.436] 
In Pale        -0.129  -0.150          
         [0.0566]**  [0.0588]**          
Observations  2729  2729  2729  2729     1670  1670 
R-squared  0.113  0.113  0.115  0.116     0.110  0.110 
   Trust (1 to 5) 
   Whole sample     PSUs within pale 
Log (distance to pogroms+10)  -0.127  -0.111  -0.0935  -0.0874     -0.116  -0.120 
   [0.0424]***  [0.0459]**  [0.0461]**  [0.0478]*     [0.0603]*  [0.0657]* 
Percent of Jews in uezd, 1897     1.184     0.741        -0.210 
      [0.890]     [0.920]        [1.001] 
In Pale        0.345  0.304          
         [0.145]**  [0.151]**          
Observations  2659  2659  2659  2659     1621  1621 
R-squared  0.052  0.053  0.055  0.056     0.061  0.061 
 
Note: The sample includes urban PSUs in all countries with data on pogroms: Belarus, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland, Ukraine, Poland, Estonia, and western Russia inside the Russian 
Empire. The list of controls includes country dummies, religious fractionalization, Western Ukraine dummy, gender, age (with a quadratic term), education level dummies, 
consumption, employment status dummies, ethnic minority dummy, and religion dummies, elevation, longitude, east Ukraine dummy. Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters 









































Online Data Appendix A 
 











4 483 300 11.3% 2 083 668 37.0%
1 Bessarabiya 228 168 11.8% 109 065 37.2%
2 Vilenskaya 202 374 12.7% 85 250 43.1%
3 Vitebskaya 174 240 11.7% 112 480 52.1%
4V o l y n s k a y a 394 774 13.2% 118 727 50.8%
5G r o d n e n s k a y a 278 542 17.4% 146 907 57.7%
6 Ekaterinoslavskaya 99 152 4.7% 62 602 26.0%
7 Kievskaya 430 489 12.1% 142 222 31.0%
8K o v e n s k a y a 212 028 13.7% 61 694 43.1%
9M i n s k a y a 343 466 16.0% 132 278 58.8%
10 Moghilevskaya 203 507 12.1% 77 082 52.4%
11 Podoliya 369 306 12.2% 102 204 46.1%
12 Poltavskaya 110 855 4.0% 80 994 29.5%
13 Taurida 55 418 3.8% 34 248 11.8%
14 Chernigovskaya 113 787 5.0% 54 401 26.0%
15 Congress of Poland 1 267 194 13.5% 763 514 34.3%
The Pale of Settlement












































Table A2. Sources of election data 
 
Country Source  Website 
Latvia  The Central Election Commission of Latvia  http://www.cvk.lv/ 
Ukraine  The Ukraine Central Electoral Commission  http://www.cvk.gov.ua/ 
Russia  The Central Electoral Commission of the Russian 
Federation 
http://www.cikrf.ru/ 
Lithuania  The Seimas of the Republic of Lithuania  http://www3.lrs.lt/ 




Table A3. Coding of political parties as “liberal, pro-market” vs. “socialist, anti-market”  
Election  Coding  Party name  Short description of ideology 
Latvia, 1998  Pro-market  People’s Party (TP)  conservative, right-wing, pro-market 
 Pro-market  Latvia’s Way (LC)  conservative-liberal, pro-market 
 Anti-market  National Harmony Party 
(TSP) 
left-wing, pro-government intervention 
Latvia, 2002  Pro-market  People’s Party (TP)  conservative, right-wing, pro-market 
 Pro-market  Latvia’s Way (LC)  conservative-liberal, pro-market 
 Anti-market  For Human Rights in United 
Latvia 
left-wing, pro-government intervention (union 
of National Harmony Party, Latvian Socialist 
Party, and Equal Rights) 
Latvia, 2006  Pro-market  People’s Party (TP)  conservative, right-wing, pro-market 
 Pro-market  Latvia’s Way (LC)  conservative-liberal, pro-market 
 Anti-market  National Harmony Party 
(TSP) 
left-wing, pro-government intervention 
Ukraine, 1998  Pro-market  People's Movement of 
Ukraine (Narodnyi Rukh) 
centre-right, moderately pro-market 
 Pro-market  Our Ukraine  centre-right, pro-market, nationalist 
 Anti-market  Communist Party of Ukraine  left-wing, program: social support of retired, 
headed by Petr Symonenko 
 Anti-market  Socialist Peasant Party of 
Ukraine 
left-wing, pro-government intervention, 
effectively merged with Socialist Party of 
Ukraine in 1998 
Ukraine, 2002  Pro-market  Our Ukraine  centre-right, pro-market, nationalist 
 Pro-market  Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc  centre-right, moderately pro-market 
 Anti-market  Communist Party of Ukraine  left-wing, program: social support of retired, 
headed by Petr Symonenko 
 Anti-market  Socialist Party of Ukraine  left-wing, pro-government intervention, headed 
by Alexander Moroz 
Ukraine, 2006  Pro-market  Our Ukraine  centre-right, pro-market, nationalist 
 Pro-market  Yulia Tymoshenko Bloc  centre-right, moderately pro-market 
 Anti-market  Communist Party of Ukraine  left-wing, program: social support of retired, 
headed by Petr Symonenko 
 Anti-market  Socialist Party of Ukraine  left-wing, pro-government intervention, headed 
by Alexander Moroz 
Russia, 1995  Pro-market  Yabloko  socially liberal, pro-market 
 Anti-market  Communist Party of Russia  left-wing, pro-government intervention, 
nationalist 









































 Pro-market  Union of Right Forces  right-wing, economically liberal, pro-market 
 Anti-market  Communist Party of Russia  left-wing, pro-government intervention, 
nationalist 
Russia, 2003  Pro-market  Yabloko  socially liberal, pro-market 
 Pro-market  Union of Right Forces  right-wing, economically liberal, pro-market 
 Anti-market  Communist Party of Russia  left-wing, pro-government intervention, 
nationalist 
Lithuania, 1996  Pro-market  Lithuanian Liberal Union  conservatively liberal, pro-market 
 Anti-market  Lithuanian Democratic 
Labor Party (LDDP) 
pro-government intervention, emerged out of 
the Communist Party of Lithuania; 
 Anti-market  Lithuanian Social 
Democratic Party (LSDP) 
pro-government intervention, socially-
democratic 
 Anti-market  Lithuanian Socialist Party  communist, socialist, pro-government 
intervention 
Lithuania, 2000  Pro-market  Lithuanian Liberal Union  conservatively liberal, pro-market 
 Anti-market  Algirdas Brazauskas Social-
Democratic Coalition 
left-wing, pro-government intervention, headed 
by former communist 
Lithuania, 2004  Pro-market  Liberal and Centre Union  liberal, pro-market, formed after merger 
between Lithuanian Liberal Union and 
Lithuanian Centre Union in 2003 
 Anti-market  Algirdas Brazauskas Social-
Democratic Coalition 
left-wing, pro-government intervention, headed 
by former communist 
Poland, 2001  Pro-market  Civic Platform  centre-right, liberal, pro-market 
 Pro-market  Freedom Union  centre, liberal, pro-market 
 Anti-market  Law and Justice  right-wing, pro-government intervention 
Poland, 2005  Pro-market  Civic Platform  centre-right, liberal, pro-market 
 Anti-market  Law and Justice  right-wing, pro-government intervention 
Poland, 2007  Pro-market  Civic Platform  centre-right, liberal, pro-market 









































Table A4. Summary statistics, election data, sample of regions with within-region variation in each 
country.  
Country % of total vote Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Latvia:
Districts inside Pale:
Anti-market 24 33.13 15.15 8.51 56.28
Pro-market 24 23.15 10.39 4.81 43.40
Districts outside Pale:
Anti-market 66 7.17 6.13 1.24 27.35
Pro-market 66 33.45 8.92 13.51 55.43
Districts on the border:
Anti-market 12 12.13 9.23 1.90 27.35
Pro-market 12 32.80 10.01 13.51 48.79
Russia:
Districts inside Pale:
Anti-market 45 37.14 16.52 11.19 96.61
Pro-market 45 3.33 2.19 0.64 12.02
Districts outside Pale:
Anti-market 315 25.97 11.77 0.00 80.96
Pro-market 315 5.07 5.25 0.00 60.89
Districts on the border:
Anti-market 51 30.94 10.96 14.87 54.46
Pro-market 51 2.91 1.36 0.91 7.09
Ukraine:
Districts inside Pale:
Anti-market 54 28.83 14.37 3.45 56.78
Pro-market 54 7.34 11.18 2.35 69.08
Districts outside Pale:
Anti-market 131 24.65 17.33 0.99 63.35
Pro-market 131 20.35 24.56 1.54 90.98
Districts on the border:
Anti-market 55 27.86 18.86 1.85 63.35
Pro-market 55 16.66 21.96 1.54 85.70
Poland:
Districts in-moved country:
Anti-market 630 15.35 9.66 0 44.04
Pro-market 630 25.48 15.4 0 69.6
Districts out-moved country:
Anti-market 1299 19.95 13.1 0 64.79
Pro-market 1299 24.09 13.64 0 64.73
Lithuania:
Districts in-moved country:
Anti-market 36 18.14 5.92 5.31 30.94
Pro-market 36 13.07 10.27 0.48 30.11
Districts out-moved country:
Anti-market 36 25.15 9.15 11.37 51.95
Pro-market 36 7.33 5.75 0.26 19.95
District on the border:
Anti-market 18 23.71 10.83 11.37 51.95
Pro-market 18 7.66 5.36 0.26 17.39 









































Table A5. Description of variables used in the analysis of the LiTS survey data 
Outcomes 
Prefer market  Dummy equals 1 if the respondent prefers a market economy to any other form of 
economic system. The exact question asked was: “Which of the following 
statements do you agree with most? a/ A market economy is preferable to any 
other form of economic system. b/ Under some circumstances, a planned 
economy may be preferable to a market economy. c/ For people like me, it does 
not matter whether the economic system is organized as a market economy or as a 
planned economy.” 
Prefer democracy  Dummy equals 1 if the respondent prefers democracy over autocratic regimes. 
The exact question asked was: “Which of the following statements do you agree 
with most? a/ Democracy is preferable to any other form of political system. b/ 
Under some circumstances, an authoritarian government may be preferable to a 
democratic one. c/ For people like me, it does not matter whether the a 
government is democratic or authoritarian.” 
Economic situation 
today better than 
around 1989 
Extent to which the respondent agrees that the economic situation in her country 
is better today than around 1989. The question asked was: “To what extent do you 
agree with the following statement: The economic situation in this country is 
better today than around 1989: 1=Strongly disagree, 2=Disagree, 3=Neither 
disagree nor agree, 4=Agree, 5=Strongly agree.” 
Satisfaction with 
present state of the 
economy 
Extent to which the respondent is satisfied with the present state of the economy. 
The question asked was: “To what extent do you agree with the following 
statement: On the whole, I am satisfied with the present state of the economy: 




Dummy equals 1 if the respondent moved to self-employment and 
entrepreneurship before 2006. We only refer to working-age respondents, i.e. 
respondents with an age between 18 and 60 years for any year.  
Trust  Dummy equals 1 if the respondent indicates that she has some trust or complete 
trust in others. The question asked was: “Generally speaking, would you say that 
most people can be trusted, or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with 
people? 1=complete distrust, 2=some distrust, 3=neither trust nor distrust, 4= 
some trust, 5=complete trust.”  
Individual level controls 
Gender  Gender of the respondent (0=female, 1=male). 
Age  Age of the respondent (with a quadratic term). 
Ethnic minority  Dummy equals 1 if the respondent considers himself as a member of an ethnic 
minority in his country. 
Religion  Dummies for the religion of the respondent: (1) atheistic / agnostic / none, (2) 
Jewish, (3) Christian, (5) Muslim, (6) other. 
Consumption  Approximated by total household’s annualized consumption expenditures per 
(equalized) household member. Children younger than 14 years enter with a 
weight of 0.3. The information on consumption expenditures is given by the head 









































Relative income  Subjective household’s wealth ranking on an imaginary ten-step ladder (from the 
poorest to the richest). This information is given by the head of household (or 
another knowledgeable household member).The question asked was: “Please 
imagine a ten-step ladder where on the bottom, the first step, stand the poorest 
people and on the highest step, the tenth, stand the richest. On which step of the 
ten is you household today?” 
Education   Dummies for highest educational degree obtained by the respondent: (1) no 
degree, (2) highest compulsory, (3) secondary education, (4) professional, 
vocational school/training, (5) higher professional degree (university, college), (6) 
Postgraduate degree.  
Employment   Dummy equals 1 if the respondent had a job within the previous seven days at the 
time of the survey. 
Retired  Dummy equals 1 if the respondent was retired at the time of the survey. 
Unemployment  Dummy equals 1 if the respondent was actively looking for a job at the time of 
the survey. 






An index calculated for each PSU = 1 – ((Share of Christians)
2 + (Share of 
Muslims)
2 + (Share of Jews)
2 + (Share of atheists)
2 + (Share of other religions)
2) 
Location  Dummies for location of the interviewed household: (1) metropolitan, (2) rural, or 
(3) urban (excluding metropolitan) area. 
Longitude  Coordinates measuring the position of the settlement on the Earth's surface 
(compared to the Prime Meridian which is the longitude that runs through 
Greenwich, England). 
Elevation  Elevation above sea level, in meters. 
Temperature  Mean temperature, in °C (1 decimal). 
Precipitation  Mean precipitation, in mm (0 decimal). 
Cloudiness  Mean sunshine or cloudiness, in % (0 decimal). 
Potential evaporation  The amount of water that could be evaporated and transpired if there were 
sufficient water available (mm, 0 decimal). 
Actual  evaporation  The sum of evaporation and plant transpiration from the Earth's land surface to 
atmosphere (mm, 0 decimal). 
Sources: 
For individual level controls, religious fractionalization, and location: Life in Transition Survey 










































Table A6. Summary statistics by Pale dummy, LiTS data, urban and metropolitan PSUs in Latvia, Ukraine, and Russia 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Prefer market 1220 0.37 0.48 0 1 619 0.39 0.49 0 1
Prefer democracy 1220 0.51 0.50 0 1 618 0.54 0.50 0 1
Econ. sit. today vs. 1989 1108 3.01 1.20 1 5 544 2.24 1.10 1 5
Satisfaction with economy 1153 2.63 1.09 1 5 593 2.13 0.94 1 5
Self-employment 730 0.06 0.25 0 1 330 0.06 0.23 0 1
Trust 1204 0.35 0.48 0 1 605 0.44 0.50 0 1
Male 1220 0.35 0.48 0 1 620 0.39 0.49 0 1
Consumption 1219 7.89 0.75 4.84 10.04 619 7.71 0.76 5.80 9.93
Education: no degree 1220 0.02 0.13 0 1 619 0.01 0.09 0 1
Education: compulsory  1220 0.13 0.33 0 1 619 0.10 0.30 0 1
Education: secondary 1220 0.34 0.47 0 1 619 0.36 0.48 0 1
Education: professional 1220 0.27 0.44 0 1 619 0.30 0.46 0 1
Education: higher 1220 0.01 0.08 0 1 619 0.01 0.09 0 1
Employed in last 7 days 1220 0.54 0.50 0 1 620 0.47 0.50 0 1
Retired in 2006 1220 0.26 0.44 0 1 620 0.28 0.45 0 1
Unemployed in 2006 1220 0.05 0.21 0 1 620 0.06 0.23 0 1
Student in 2006 1220 0.03 0.16 0 1 620 0.05 0.21 0 1
Ethnic minority 1219 0.13 0.34 0 1 618 0.11 0.31 0 1
HH religion 1220 0.29 0.18 0 0.7875 620 0.19 0.17 0 0.485
Age 1220 48.33 18.96 18 97 620 46.60 19.22 18 88
Age squared 1220 2695.16 1923.89 324.00 9409.00 620 2540.74 1919.13 324.00 7744.00
Christian 1220 0.79 0.41 0 1 620 0.88 0.33 0 1
Muslim 1220 0.02 0.14 0 1 620 0.00 0.04 0 1
Jewish 1220 0.00 0.00 0 0 620 0.006 0.08 0 1
Metropolitan 1220 0.39 0.49 0 1 620 0.23 0.42 0 1
Longitude 1220 33.59 11.83 21.00 73.39 620 31.20 3.71 24.72 38.05
Latitude 1220 55.28 3.40 45.25 62.14 620 49.89 3.19 44.95 56.55
Elevation 1220 77.10 67.28 3 213 620 129.77 60.25 20 293
Temperature 1220 5.34 2.28 -2.15 10.55 620 7.48 1.48 4.95 10.90
Clowdiness 1220 32.30 4.93 28 46 620 37.73 5.74 28.5 49
Precipitation 1220 56.95 7.04 41 79.5 620 53.15 8.65 34.5 69.5
Evaporation 1220 46.48 6.00 26.5 56.5 620 45.05 9.53 23 62.5
Log(distance for pogrom +10) 1220 3.85 1.36 2.30 6.71 620 2.67 0.70 2.30 4.29
Distance to pogrom 1220 100.81 160.58 0 809.28 620 9.79 19.52 0 62.81










































Table A7. Summary statistics by Pale dummy, LiTS data, rural PSUs, in Latvia, Ukraine, and Russia 
Variable Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max Obs Mean Std. Dev. Min Max
Prefer market 560 0.31 0.46 0 1 300 0.31 0.46 0 1
Prefer democracy 560 0.47 0.50 0 1 300 0.52 0.50 0 1
Econ. sit. today vs. 1989 522 2.93 1.22 1 5 284 2.15 1.08 1 5
Satisfaction with economy 537 2.70 1.14 1 5 288 2.06 0.94 1 5
Self-employment 298 0.05 0.22 0 1 124 0.04 0.20 0 1
Trust 547 0.30 0.46 0 1 297 0.41 0.49 0 1
Male 560 0.41 0.49 0 1 300 0.32 0.47 0 1
Consumption 559 7.71 0.74 4.67 10.22 300 7.20 0.78 4.62 9.82
Education: no degree 560 0.02 0.13 0 1 300 0.05 0.23 0 1
Education: compulsory  560 0.21 0.41 0 1 300 0.18 0.38 0 1
Education: secondary 560 0.36 0.48 0 1 300 0.36 0.48 0 1
Education: professional 560 0.15 0.35 0 1 300 0.13 0.34 0 1
Education: higher 560 0.00 0.00 0 0 300 0.00 0.00 0 0
Employed in last 7 days 560 0.48 0.50 0 1 300 0.34 0.47 0 1
Retired in 2006 560 0.28 0.45 0 1 300 0.41 0.49 0 1
Unemployed in 2006 560 0.05 0.22 0 1 300 0.08 0.27 0 1
Student in 2006 560 0.02 0.14 0 1 300 0.01 0.10 0 1
Ethnic minority 560 0.10 0.30 0 1 299 0.10 0.30 0 1
HH religion 560 0.33 0.17 0 0.58 300 0.16 0.16 0 0.4875
Age 560 48.74 17.52 18 89 300 51.61 17.91 18 91
Age squared 560 2682.55 1765.63 324.00 7921.00 300 2983.51 1865.56 324.00 8281.00
Christian 560 0.72 0.45 0 1 300 0.90 0.30 0 1
Muslim 560 0.01 0.12 0 1 300 0.01 0.11 0 1
Jewish 560 0.00 0.00 0 0 300 0.00 0.00 0 0
Longitude 560 35.23 12.85 21.19 65.51 300 31.15 2.67 26.53 34.60
Latitude 560 55.78 4.04 44.73 67.58 300 50.01 3.51 45.52 56.50
Elevation 560 110.04 75.24 3 330 300 118.20 64.56 17 273
Temperature 560 4.75 2.81 -5.30 9.90 300 7.34 1.76 4.45 10.35
Clowdiness 560 32.55 5.05 28 42.5 300 37.77 5.85 29 47
Precipitation 560 59.13 10.22 36.5 72.5 300 52.00 8.71 34.5 67.5
Evaporation 560 45.25 5.74 27.5 52.5 300 43.17 10.11 23 58
Log(distance for pogrom +10) 560 4.69 0.88 2.75 7.01 300 3.32 0.60 2.30 4.39
Distance to pogrom 560 159.69 213.96 5.60 1094.06 300 23.02 20.55 0 70.52









































Table A8. Sources of data on ethnic composition of PSUs. 
Country Year Source 
Belarus   1897:  http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/pril.php 
Belarus   1999:  http://babylon.iatp.by/nationalRegistry/1/index.html 
Moldova   1897:  http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/pril.php 
Moldova   2004:  http://www.statistica.md/ 
Poland    1897:  http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/pril.php 
Poland    1900:  http://verwaltungsgeschichte.de/ 
Poland    2002:  http://www.stat.gov.pl/gus/6647_4520_PLK_HTML.htm 
Ukraine   1897:  http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/pril.php 
Ukraine   2001:  http://www.ukrcensus.gov.ua/eng/results/general/nationality/ 
Latvia            1897:  http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/pril.php 
Latvia            2000:  http://data.csb.gov.lv/ 
Lithuania         1897:  http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/pril.php 
Lithuania         1900:  http://verwaltungsgeschichte.de/ 
Lithuania         2001:  http://www.stat.gov.lt 
Russia    1897:  http://www.demoscope.ru/weekly/pril.php 
Russia    2002:  http://www.perepis2002.ru/ 




Table A9. Summary statistics, Movements of population data  
PSUs in Latvia, Lithuania, Ukraine, Poland, Belarus, and Western Russia 
   Obs Mean Std. Dev.  Min Max
In “moved country”  291 0.19 0.39  0 1
Change in ethnic composition among Gentile groups  291 14.38% 16.01%  0.00% 68.05%










































A 10. Definition and data sources of pogrom data 
 
We define pogroms as a large-scale violence against Jews in Eastern Europe and Russia, carried out and organized by the local non-Jewish 
population. We collected data on the coordinates of pogroms that took place on territories of former Russian Empire which cover contemporary 
Belarus, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Poland, Russia, and Ukraine between 1821 (the first major pogrom in Odessa) and 1946 (a series of 
pogroms in Poland). First, we compiled the list of 598 pogroms in these territories. We used works of several prominent historians: Arad, 
Blobaum, Engel, Klier, Kopciowski, Lambroza, Miliakova, Sherman, Szymanska, and Zbikowski among others. In addition, we used the 
American Jewish Yearbook of 1906-1907, multiple online sources devoted to European Jewish history, and contemporary to the events newspaper 
articles describing riots against Jews in Ukraine and Russia. (We provide the complete list of sources below). Three most vivid pogrom waves are: 
1) those which took place during the 19th century, especially after the assassination of tsar Alexander II, 2) those at the beginning of the 20th 
century, around the first Russian Revolution of 1905, and 3) those happening simultaneously with the Russian Revolution of 1917 and thereafter. 
Second, we searched for geographic coordinates of every settlement or town where each of these pogroms took place using historical maps and 
digital information systems. Some relevant villages ceased to exist – mostly as a result of the Second World War (e.g., Justingrad) or due to other 
catastrophes, such as the Chernobyl disaster, which lead to a dead zone with no apparent signs life within a radius of about 30km around the 
infamous power plant. Villages that used to exist there at the beginning of the 20th century, and where atrocities against Jews were perpetrated, are 
now simply gone. In such cases, either the historical location of the perished village is used, or the pogrom is dropped from the analysis. As a 
result we collected coordinates for 527 different pogroms in Eastern Europe. Figure B6 in the Auxiliary Results Appendix presents the map of 
pogroms. 
 
Printed sources for pogrom data: 
1.  American Jewish Year Book Vol. 8 (1906-1907) 
2.  Arad, Yitzak (2009), The Holocaust in the Soviet Union, Lincoln: University of Nebraska Press and Jerusalem: Yad Vashem. 
3.  Blobaum, Robert (2005), Antisemitism and Its opponents in modern Poland, Cornell University Press, New York. 
4.  Engel, David (1998), “Patterns of Anti-Jewish Violence in Poland 1944-1946”, Yad Vashem Studies, n° 26, 43-85. 
5.  Klier, John D. and Shlomo Lambroza (1992), Pogroms: Anti-Jewish Violence in Modern Russian History, Cambridge University Press, New 
York. 
6.  Kopciowski, Adam (2007), "Zajscia antyzydowskie na lubelszczyznie nw pierwszych latach po drugiej wojnie swiatowej" (Anti-Jewish 
Incidents in the Lublin Region in the Early Years after World War II), in: Zaglada Zydow. Studia i Materialy, Centrum Badan nad Zaglada 
Zydow, IFiS PAN, Warszawa. 
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Online Auxiliary Results Appendix B 
 
Table B1. Election results for the Socialist Party of Ukraine  
In Pale 2.435*** 2.754*** 2.462**
[0.842] [0.867] [0.962]






Observations 165 165 125
R-squared 0.717 0.737 0.711
Regional center excluded No No Yes
Regions with variation Yes Yes Yes
Percent of vote for the socialist party 
in a district, Ukraine
 
Note: OLS. Election and region dummies are included in the list of covariates in all regressions. Robust standard errors in parentheses clustered by 
electoral district.  









































Table B2. The Pale and contemporary attitudes, no controls included. Sample: urban and metropolitan PSUs in Latvia, Ukraine, and Russia.  
sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression 
sample 70  sample 35 
RD 
regression 
sample 70  sample 35 
RD 
regression 
In Pale -0.153 -0.233 -0.178 -0.183 -0.275 -0.206 -0.74 -0.369 -0.758
[0.049]*** [0.063]*** [0.056]*** [0.057]*** [0.069]*** [0.092]** [0.204]*** [0.236] [0.193]***
Observations 840 240 1839 840 240 1838 762 227 1652
R-squared 0.02 0.06 0.03 0.02 0.08 0.04 0.06 0.03 0.11
PSUs in Pale 9 6 31 9 6 31 9 6 31
PSUs outside Pale 33 6 61 33 6 61 33 6 61
sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression 
sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression 
sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression 
In Pale -0.423 -0.306 -0.407 -0.056 -0.069 -0.08 0.15 0.216 0.21
[0.154]*** [0.202] [0.170]** [0.023]** [0.047] [0.033]** [0.040]*** [0.069]*** [0.075]***
Observations 807 231 1746 487 144 1060 832 235 1809
R-squared 0.02 0.02 0.07 0.01 0.02 0.03 0.02 0.05 0.02
PSUs in Pale 9 6 31 9 6 31 9 6 31
PSUs outside Pale 33 6 61 33 6 61 33 6 61
Prefer market Prefer democracy Econ. situation compared to 1989
Urban and metropolitan settlements
Satisfaction with economy Self-employment Trust
 
Note: For each dependent variable we present two reduced sample regressions with the distance to the border of the Pale below 70 and 35 km, and RD 
regression, which includes two polynomials of distance on both sides of the border in the list of covariates. Robust standard errors adjusted for clusters at PSU 











































Table B3. Channels. Election results in the “moved country” 
   Percent of vote for anti-market parties in a district 
Country sample  Lithuania  Lithuania  Lithuania  Poland  Poland  Poland 
Moved country  -3.685  -8.944***  -10.430*** -4.168***  -4.167***  -4.179*** 
   [2.300]  [2.523]  [2.689]  [0.899]  [0.900]  [0.905] 
Moved country border  -3.363  -2.710  -3.043  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   [2.074]  [1.994]  [2.173]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Town     0.000  0.000     -1,11  1,088 
      [0.000]  [0.000]     [1.363]  [1.367] 
Regional center     6.832***        3.535*    
      [1.574]        [1.805]    
Election & regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  72  72  39  1929  1929  1917 
R-squared  0.672  0.739  0.753  0.501  0,679  0,68 
Regional center excluded  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Regions with variation  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
   Percent of vote for pro-market parties in a district 
Country sample  Lithuania  Lithuania  Lithuania  Poland  Poland  Poland 
Moved country  6.038***  -0.297  -2.198  1.455  1.496  1.500 
   [1.602]  [1.858]  [1.765]  [2.157]  [2.210]  [2.215] 
Moved country border  0.594  1.380  0.955  0.000  0.000  0.000 
   [1.167]  [1.074]  [1.135]  [0.000]  [0.000]  [0.000] 
Town     0.000  0.000     6.850***  6.836*** 
      [0.000]  [0.000]     [1.621]  [1.625] 
Regional center     8.231***        15.542***    
      [1.818]        [1.964]    
Election & regional dummies  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Observations  72  72  39  1929  1929  1917 
R-squared  0.644  0.733  0.556  0.503  0.518  0.512 
Regional center excluded  No  No  Yes  No  No  Yes 
Regions with variation  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Note: Moved country is a dummy for the Lithuanian districts belonging to the Second Polish Republic before the Second World War or   









































Table B4. Middle class on the two sides of the Pale border 
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
In Pale -0.05 -0.073 -0.131 -0.1 -0.11 0.011 0.019 -0.019 0.014 0.034
[0.051] [0.061] [0.089] [0.062] [0.086] [0.061] [0.064] [0.083] [0.056] [0.071]
Observations 1956 999 839 239 1956 1954 997 837 237 1954
R-squared 0.07 0.07 0.08 0.13 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.07 0.17 0.08
Middle class (relative income) Middle class (consumption)
Urban and metropolitan PSUs
 








th decile of the distribution. The results do not change if we take narrower or wider definitions. For each dependent variable we present five 
regressions: OLS, three reduced sample regressions with the distance to the border of the Pale below 140, 70 and 35 km, and RD regression, which  
includes two polynomials of distance on both sides of the border in the list of covariates. List of controls includes country dummies, metropolitan area 
dummy, religious fractionalization, Western Ukraine dummy (in OLS and RD regression), longitude, elevation, gender, age (with a quadratic term), 
education level dummies, employment status dummies, ethnic minority dummy, and religion dummies. In sample 35, we exclude longitude from the list 









































Table B5.Controlling for Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth, Sample: urban and metropolitan PSUs in Latvia, Ukraine and Western Russia 
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
OLS sample 140 sample 70 sample 35
RD 
regression
In Pale -0.166 -0.134 -0.169 -0.133 -0.204 -0.187 -0.174 -0.231 -0.274 -0.242
[0.052]*** [0.076]* [0.074]** [0.092] [0.072]*** [0.063]*** [0.075]** [0.073]*** [0.088]*** [0.087]***
In PLC -0.091 -0.066 -0.159 -0.206 -0.074 0.108 0.059 -0.068 -0.206 0.141
[0.077] [0.068] [0.049]*** [0.078]** [0.096] [0.105] [0.087] [0.063] [0.127] [0.117]
Observations 1833 996 837 237 1833 1832 996 837 237 1832
R-squared 0.11 0.11 0.11 0.18 0.12 0.09 0.1 0.1 0.13 0.11
In Pale -0.347 -0.337 -0.308 -0.348 -0.584 -0.215 -0.404 -0.405 -0.211 -0.392
[0.192]* [0.170]* [0.225] [0.388] [0.245]** [0.149] [0.146]*** [0.159]** [0.389] [0.171]**
In PLC -0.192 -0.397 -0.648 0.005 -0.209 0.032 0.125 -0.048 -0.218 -0.034
[0.229] [0.180]** [0.236]*** [0.378] [0.259] [0.185] [0.194] [0.163] [0.301] [0.198]
Observations 1646 908 759 224 1646 1741 955 804 228 1741
R-squared 0.19 0.21 0.23 0.14 0.21 0.11 0.11 0.12 0.15 0.13
In Pale -0.066 -0.107 -0.129 -0.029 -0.115 0.205 0.215 0.217 0.265 0.293
[0.034]* [0.050]** [0.061]** [0.071] [0.048]** [0.053]*** [0.061]*** [0.065]*** [0.102]** [0.084]***
In PLC -0.007 0.054 0.013 -0.075 -0.011 -0.076 0.025 0.035 0.191 -0.002
[0.032] [0.047] [0.048] [0.083] [0.032] [0.084] [0.085] [0.057] [0.097]* [0.099]
Observations 1057 572 486 143 1057 1803 988 829 232 1803
R-squared 0.04 0.06 0.06 0.14 0.06 0.04 0.06 0.05 0.1 0.05
Prefer market to planed economy Prefer democracy to autocratic regime
Self-employment Trust
Economic situation better in 2006 than in 1989 Satisfaction with present state of economy
 
 
Note: For each dependent variable we present five regressions: OLS, three reduced sample regressions with the distance to the border of 
the Pale below 140, 70 and 35 km, and RD regression, which  includes two polynomials of distance on both sides of the border in the list 
of covariates. List of controls includes country dummies, metropolitan area dummy, religious fractionalization, Western Ukraine dummy 
(in OLS and RD regression), longitude, elevation, gender, age (with a quadratic term), education level dummies, consumption, 
employment status dummies, ethnic minority dummy, and religion dummies. In sample 35, we exclude longitude from the list of 










































Table B6. Latvia only (territory inside the Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth) Sample: urban and metropolitan PSUs 
OLS sample 70 sample 35 OLS sample 70 sample 35
In Pale -0.214 -0.199 -0.174 -0.259 -0.23 -0.176
[0.080]** [0.071]*** [0.034]*** [0.090]*** [0.085]** [0.089]*
Observations 678 618 138 678 618 138
R-squared 0.09 0.09 0.19 0.06 0.07 0.16
PSUs in Pale 553 553
PSUs outside Pale 29 26 4 29 26 4
In Pale -0.929 -0.928 -0.755 -0.452 -0.423 -0.245
[0.227]*** [0.234]*** [0.111]*** [0.186]** [0.184]** [0.166]
Observations 630 571 131 665 607 134
R-squared 0.18 0.19 0.24 0.08 0.09 0.16
PSUs in Pale 553 553
PSUs outside Pale 29 26 4 29 26 4
In Pale -0.036 -0.019 0.017 0.174 0.203 0.275
[0.048] [0.043] [0.039] [0.076]** [0.073]*** [0.098]**
Observations 379 349 77 676 616 138
R-squared 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.04 0.05 0.13
PSUs in Pale 553 553
PSUs outside Pale 29 26 4 29 26 4
Self-employment Trust
Prefer market to planed economy
Prefer democracy to autocratic 
regime
Economic situation better in 2006 
than in 1989




Note: For each dependent variable we present three regressions: OLS, and two reduced sample regressions with the distance to the 
border of the Pale below 70 and 35 km. List of controls includes metropolitan area dummy, religious fractionalization, gender, age (with 
a quadratic term), education level dummies, consumption, employment status dummies, ethnic minority dummy, and religion dummies. 









































Table B7. Results of placebo regressions 
 
South-West of shifted Pale 
border West of meridian
Number of placebo regressions 60 30
% of coefficients with the same sign as baseline 38.3% 56.7%
% of coefficients with at least 10% significance level of the same sign as in baseline 8.3% 6.7%
% of coefficients with at least 5% significance level of the same sign as in baseline 3.3% 3.3%
% of coefficients with at least 1% significance level of the same sign as in baseline 1.7% 0.0%  
Note: The table summarizes the results of the placebo experiment in which our six outcomes (prefer market, prefer democracy, economic situation 
better today, satisfaction with present state of economy, self-employment, and trust) are related to a placebo pale treatment in which we “shift” the 
border of the Pale or consider being west of a particular meridian as treatment. In both cases we estimate RD regressions on the sample of urban 
and metropolitan PSUs. The first column gives the summary of the results for the placebo, in which treatment is defined as distance to the actual 
Pale border above 225, 200, 150, 100, 50,-225, -200, -150. -100 and -50 kilometers (instead of zero, as in the baseline regressions). In these 
regressions we use our standard set of controls. The second column summarizes results for the placebo experiment where the treatment is defined 










































Figure B1. Map of the Pale of Settlement 
 
Note: Thin dashed line represents the border of the Pale of Settlement; thick opaque line portrays the Western land border of the Russian Empire. 
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Note: For each distance, the graph presents plain averages over all observations on the particular side of the Pale border that are located at most at 
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Figure B5. Missing middle class. Relative income (10-step ladder) and consumption of residents of LiTS PSUs in Latvia, Russia, and Ukraine 
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These differences are statistically insignificant: Two-sample Kolmogorov-Smirnov test for equality of distribution functions yields p-value of 
0.641 for relative income and 0.162 for consumption for differences in distributions of these variables in and out of the Pale. F-test for equality of 




















































































 Figure B7. Pale borders, Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth, Second Polish Republic, and LITs PSUs. 
 
Polish–Lithuanian Commonwealth border as of 1619 is area market in blue; Second Polish Republic is the area market in green, Pale border is 
solid pink, dots indicate LITs PSUs; red thin lines mark contemporary country borders. 
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